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ABSTRACT
The functional nature of computer software underlies two propositions
that were, until recently, fairly well settled in intellectual property law:
first, that software, like other utilitarian articles, may qualify for patent
protection; and second, that the scope of copyright protection for
software is comparatively limited. Both propositions have become con-
siderably shakier as a result of recent court decisions. Following Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), the lower courts have
invalidated many software patents as unprotectable subject matter.
Meanwhile, Oracle America v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2014) extended far more expansive copyright protection to functional
software components than precedent suggested. The result of these de-
velopments has been a new period of uncertainty regarding the exis-
tence and scope of intellectual property protection for computer
software.
The root of the problem lies in Congress’s relative inattention to the
question of what legal regime (if any) should govern the creation of
computer software. Congress extended copyright protection to software
largely without grappling with the consequences of applying a body of
law designed to promote creative expression to functional, useful code.
Meanwhile, Congress has spoken only obliquely to the question
whether software warrants patent protection. The turmoil in the courts
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reflects a general lack of legislative guidance. This Article asks
whether the time is ripe for remedial legislation and suggests some
questions that ought to guide congressional inquiry.
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INTRODUCTION
Computer software is uniquely challenging subject matter for intellec-
tual property law, because software perfectly fits none of the law’s gov-
erning paradigms. Like literary works—ordinarily the subject matter of
copyright law—software is “expressed” in the form of alphanumeric sym-
bols (to wit, the source code written by one or more computer program-
mers).1 Unlike, say, a poem or an essay, however, software also has
functional characteristics: the symbols expressing its source code are trans-
1. See, e.g., U.S. NATIONAL COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 10 (1979) (“Computer programs are prepared by the careful fixation of
words, phrases, numbers, and other symbols in various media.”), 15 (“In this respect [a pro-
gram] is the same as a novel, poem, play, musical score, blueprint, advertisement, or telephone
directory.”) [hereafter “CONTU FINAL REPORT”]
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lated, before or during execution of the program, into a usable form that
performs work on a computer.2 It’s partly functional nature gives software,
in operation, the character of a machine, system, or process—ordinarily the
subject matter of patent law, not copyright.3 Programs use symbols not only
to communicate, but to describe (and, indeed, to implement) a system that
actually performs work.4 Software thus straddles one of intellectual prop-
erty’s most important conceptual divides.5
The copyright-patent distinction is not merely semantic, because copy-
right and patent law provide very different protections to authors and inven-
tors. Copyright law defines six specific uses of protected works that infringe
if conducted without authorization of the copyright holder (necessarily leav-
ing uses outside the enumerated six unrestricted), then adds dozens of statu-
tory exceptions defining circumstances in which the law deems even
unauthorized uses noninfringing.6 Patent law, instead of enumerating spe-
cific forbidden uses (qualified by numerous exceptions), categorically for-
bids anyone to “make, use, offer to sell, or sell any patented invention,” or to
import it into the United States, without the patentee’s authorization.7 The
2. On the distinction between human-readable “source code” and the corresponding
machine-readable “object code” into which programs must be converted at or before execu-
tion, see, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 448 n.8 (2007); Id. at 459 (Alito,
J., concurring).
3. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (“In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery. . ..”), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title. . ..”).
4. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2320-24 (1994) (“Programs are machines
whose medium of construction is text.”).
5. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of
Computer Software and Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 56–66 (1997)
(analyzing the meaning and role of functionality in policing the patent-copyright boundary).
6. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 (enumerating copyright holders’ exclusive rights), 107–122
(describing limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights) (2018). Of particular interest in the
context of software are the fair use exception (§ 107), which allows unauthorized copying for
certain socially beneficial purposes; the first sale doctrine (§ 109), which permits unauthorized
redistribution of a lawfully acquired copy of a work; and a series of computer-specific excep-
tions (§ 117) allowing software to be backed up and to be used in the ordinary operation of a
computer, among other things. As the Supreme Court has made clear, United States law recog-
nizes no copyright rights not expressly granted by statute. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) (“Congress, by the [Copyright] Act of 1790, instead of sanctioning an
existing perpetual right. . . created [it].”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2018) (expressly pre-
empting any common-law rules “within the general scope of copyright”). Thus, the rights
specifically enumerated in the federal statute constitute the totality of copyright holders’ en-
forceable interests in a work; the statute denies copyright holders the right to limit uses of their
works in any respects not expressly granted.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018). The patent statute does contain a narrow exemption per-
mitting unauthorized use of patented genetic inventions for the purpose of testing drugs for
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existence of patent and copyright rights depends on different preconditions
for each form of protection, and the rights conferred endure for widely dif-
fering lengths of time.8 Moreover, the protections conferred under copyright
and patent law are, with immaterial exceptions, exclusive: what is copyright-
able generally cannot be patented, and vice versa.9 The question of whether
software is protected under copyright or patent, or whether it may include
some aspects of both forms simultaneously, is therefore highly
consequential.
Recent court decisions, however, show that the analytical framework for
resolving questions of this type has grown exceptionally shaky. Although the
courts unanimously agree that copyright protection extends to software, they
differ over how far copyright protection extends and what conduct infringes
a program’s copyright.10 On the patent side, things have grown murkier still:
although the Federal Circuit embraced software patenting with (arguably ex-
cessive) enthusiasm in the 1990s, sparking a decades-long surge in the issu-
ance of software patents by the USPTO, the law has moved sharply in the
other direction since the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bank Int’l,11 with significant consequences that the lower courts are still
resolving.12 At the time of this writing, the best that can be said is that copy-
right protection for software exists, but with ill-defined boundaries; and pat-
ent protection may be available only for certain types of software but not for
others.
regulatory approval. Id. § 271(e)(1). It also contains an exception grandfathering prior com-
mercial uses of inventions used in “manufacturing or other commercial process[es]” that were
later patented by another. Id. § 273(a); see also infra note 150 and accompanying text
(describing origin of this provision).
8. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995)
(Boudin, J., concurring) (“It is no accident that patent protection has preconditions that copy-
right protection does not—notably, the requirements of novelty and non-obviousness—and
that patents are granted for a shorter period than copyrights.”). Copyright rights last roughly
five times longer than patent rights do. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2018) (establishing copy-
right term of 95 to 120 years for works made for hire created since 1978, a category that
includes most computer software), with 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018) (establishing 20-year
patent term). Given the pace of development in the software industry, however, the differences
may be less stark than they initially appear; for practical purposes, both copyrights and patents
endure for terms that may comfortably exceed the commercial viability of the products to
which they apply.
9. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880) (holding that system or method
of accounting described in a textbook is not encompassed within the scope of the book’s
copyright; protection of systems and methods “is the province of letters-patent, not of copy-
right.”)); but cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215–17 & n.33 (1954) (suggesting that design
patent protection, as distinct from utility patent protection, may coexist with copyright protec-
tion in the same goods).
10. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Circuit
courts have struggled with, and disagree over, the tests to be employed when attempting to
draw the line between what is protectable expression and what is not.”).
11. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
12. See generally infra Part III.
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To be sure, uncertainty as to the extent of intellectual property protec-
tion for computer software is nothing new. Doctrinal fluidity is the price we
pay for applying statutes written long ago in broad, general terms to rapidly
changing technologies. Generalist judges have struggled with novel techno-
logical subject matter (with varying success) for decades. But although legal
uncertainty might have been safely ignored during the digital era’s infancy
because the law affected few people, those conditions no longer exist. In an
era where software has become a ubiquitous component of a vast assortment
of consumer products—software now runs our automobiles, household ap-
pliances, cell phones, televisions, and more—as well as a significant and
still-growing sector of the United States economy, legal uncertainty poses
substantial risk to consumers and developers alike.13
The party best situated to ameliorate the present legal uncertainty—
Congress—has largely absented itself from delineating the boundaries of
software as a form of intellectual property. The governing statute extending
copyright protection to software was enacted in 1980—eons ago, technolog-
ically speaking—and the most recent major revision of patent law (the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011) made only glancing reference to
the protectability of software. The present turmoil in the courts, however,
suggests that we have reached an opportune moment for Congress to reas-
sess the state of intellectual property protection for software. Partly in re-
13. On October 22, 2015, U.S. Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA) and Patrick Leahy (D-
VT), the Chair and ranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, asked the
Register of Copyrights to launch a year-long “comprehensive review of the role of copyright”
in regulating “how consumers can lawfully use products that rely on software to function.” See
Grassley & Leahy Call For Copyright Study, http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-re
leases/grassley-leahy-call-copyright-study (Oct. 22, 2015), archived at [perma.cc/3HV6-
WWZM] [hereafter “Senate Judiciary Committee letter”]. The Senators’ letter recognized that
“[c]opyrighted software is now essential to the operation of our refrigerators, our cars, our
farm equipment, our wireless phones, and virtually any other device you can think of”). Id.
Furthermore, the role of copyright law in regulating products and activities seemingly unre-
lated to the creative arts achieved public prominence recently following the revelation that
German auto maker Volkswagen had configured the software in its vehicles to alter the results
reported during required emissions testing. See Complaint at 14–16, United States v. Volk-
swagen AG, No. 2:16-cv-10006-LJM-MJH (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2016). The fact that the vehi-
cles’ software was protected by copyright, and was therefore subject to the prohibitions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) against circumventing technological measures
that control access to a copyrighted work, was believed to have made the detection of Volk-
swagen’s alleged manipulation more difficult. See, e.g., Mitchell Hartman, A story of dirty
emissions. . .and copyright law, MARKETPLACE (Sept. 28, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.market
place.org/2015/09/28/tech/story-dirty-emissions-%E2%80%A6-and-copyright-law, archived
at [perma.cc/82RV-TZAE]. The Volkswagen revelations surely influenced the decision of the
Copyright Office to promulgate a DMCA exemption permitting the circumvention of techno-
logical measures protecting “[c]omputer programs that are contained in and control the func-
tioning of a motorized land vehicle such as a personal automobile[.]” Exemption to Prohibition
on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 37
C.F.R. § 201.40 (2017). See generally Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When
Everything Has Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672 (2016).
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sponse to criticism by the Register of Copyrights that the copyright statute is
increasingly outdated,14 the House has held multiple hearings aimed at pro-
ducing comprehensive copyright reform legislation.15 With the Senate also
poised for possible action in the area of software,16 the time may be ripe to
reassess and synthesize the last four decades of legal and technological de-
velopment to craft rules that are more stable, certain, and better tailored to
the unique context of software.
Because the subject lies outside the expertise of most members of Con-
gress, it would be desirable for legislators to seek independent guidance
before undertaking substantial revisions to the law. One possible analogue
for such guidance may be found in the 1970s-era Commission on New Tech-
nological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”), whose investigation
prompted the enactment of the first copyright statute covering computer
software. Although many scholars have critiqued the substance of the legal
regime that resulted from CONTU’s efforts, and although some portions of
the Commission’s report have undoubtedly aged better than others, CONTU
remains noteworthy for the ambitious scope of its analysis. Although Con-
gress should revisit many of the foundational assumptions on which the orig-
inal CONTU’s analysis rested, the general idea of a disinterested expert
commission advising legislators on unfamiliar but economically important
subject matter remains appealing. Our collective understandings of the na-
ture of computer software and the role of the law in encouraging technologi-
cal development have evolved substantially during the nearly four decades
that have elapsed since Congress last meaningfully grappled with basic is-
sues about the proper scope of legal protection for software. Using those
insights better to inform policy is both a practical and economic imperative.
This Article reviews the development of intellectual property protection
for software (primarily, although not solely, governed by changes in copy-
right and patent law) with a view toward exploring how past debates may
color future doctrinal evolution. Part II explores the history of copyright pro-
tection for software, focusing first on Congress’s choice to extend copyright
protection to software works by statute, and then on the changes over time in
judicial thinking about how far the statutory protection extends. Part III turns
to patent law, where the debate has been driven less by Congress and more
by changes in the case law in the Federal Circuit and, later, the Supreme
Court. Part IV surveys the prospects for reform and concludes that Congress
is the institutional actor best suited to ameliorate the legal uncertainty that
has produced such wide swings in judicial doctrine. Finally, Part V con-
14. See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315
(2013).
15. See Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. COPYRIGHT
REVIEW, https://judiciary.house.gov/issue/us-copyright-law-review/ (last visited Jan 21, 2018),
archived at [perma.cc/Y5L8-S667] [hereafter U.S. Copyright Review].
16. See Senate Judiciary Committee letter, supra note 13.
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cludes with an assessment of what recent legal changes may suggest for the
future and proposes an agenda for further legislative study.
I. SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The 1976 Act and the Birth of Software Copyright Law
Serious effort to update the increasingly moribund Copyright Act of
1909 began in Congress in the early 1960s. Almost immediately, the appli-
cability of the statute to the new field of computer technology was recog-
nized as a significant issue. In 1963, a draft of proposed copyright legislation
included a provision that would have expressly given copyright holders the
exclusive right “to reproduce [a work] in any form in the programming or
operation of an information retrieval system.”17 Despite the proposed
clause’s reference to “programming,” however, the context suggests that
Congress was concerned primarily with the use of computers to store and
analyze ordinary works of literature and music.18
The next revision of the bill, in 1964, deleted the reference to computers
or programming—reflecting a deliberate choice, the Register of Copyrights
explained, to rely solely on “general language which can be interpreted by
the courts to apply to particular usages.”19 One witness hypothesized that the
statute’s definition of “literary work” already included computer programs
by implication, yielding “much broader copyright status” for software “than
under the present [1909] Act.”20 The General Electric Company, however,
urged Congress not to lump software in with other literary works. Rather, it
suggested, legal protection for software “should be specifically delimited in
light of the special character and problems of this art.”21
17. H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 3:
PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS
ON THE DRAFT, at 4 (Comm. Print 1964) (quoting § 5(a) of the proposed legislation).
18. See id. at 120–27. One witness, for example, imagined that it would soon become
possible to “feed a book into the machine in its entirety and then make it available to the world
at large.” Id. at 122 (statement of George Schiffer); see also id. at 374–76 (reproducing sug-
gestion by Reed C. Lawlor that computerized reproduction of works “for use in the analysis,
citation and reasonable quotation” of the computer system’s users “shall be considered a fair
use”). History eventually validated both these predictions. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.,
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). Lawlor recognized, if perhaps most members of Congress at the
time did not, that the questions “What computer-associated acts infringe a copyright?” and
“Are computer programs copyrightable?” were distinct. Reed C. Lawlor, Copyright Aspects of
Computer Usage, 11 Bull. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 380, 394 (1964).
19. H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 5:
1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS, at 63 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinaf-
ter Copyright Law Revision, Part 5].
20. Id. at 62 (statement of Morton David Goldberg); see also infra note 24 (noting that
some software had been copyrighted even under the 1909 statute).
21. Copyright Law Revision, Part 5, supra note 19, at 271 (General Electric Position
Statement).
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In 1965, the Copyright Office made explicit the implication of the 1964
draft, declaring that, in its view, “computer programs fixed on punchcards,
magnetic tape, or any other media” fell within the proposed statutory defini-
tion of a “literary work.”22 At the same time, the Copyright Office signaled
its retreat from the 1963 draft’s reference to the legality of uses of expressive
works in “information retrieval systems,” reasoning that “it would be a mis-
take for the statute, in trying to deal with such a new and evolving field as
that of computer technology, to include an explicit provision that could later
turn out to be too broad or too narrow.”23
The 1965 draft bill drew a favorable reaction from a representative of
the then-nascent commercial software industry, who predicted that the avail-
ability of copyright protection for programs would lure new investment.24
Others, however, foresaw the conceptual difficulty of treating software the
same as other literary works. The Electronic Industries Association wrote
that the basic problem lay in the impossibility of making lawful uses of
uncopyrighted material embedded within a program without duplicating the
program—a problem that did not affect other types of literary works.25 Fur-
22. H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, at 5 (Comm. Print.1965).
23. Id. at 18.
24. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835, Serial
No. 8, Part 2, at 1146 (statement of John F. Banzhaf III). Banzaf had himself successfully
sought copyright protection for a computer program even under the then-existing Copyright
Act of 1909. See Michael S. Keplinger, Computer Software—Its Nature and its Protection, 30
EMORY L.J. 483, 494–95 (1981) (describing conditions under which Copyright Office had
deemed software to be copyrightable under 1909 Act).
25. The Association explained:
The copyright grant is given to authors because the public benefits from his creative
activities. The public benefits because it is free to use the ideas contained in a copy-
righted work. For example, the public is free to copy a mathematical formula from a
copyrighted book. Computer programs are basically mathematical formulas in the
form of instructions to a computer.
This objective of the copyright laws cannot be achieved if one who lawfully obtains
a copyrighted magnetic tape cannot reduce it to intelligible form to see if it contains
a usable mathematical formula. Insofar as copyrighted computer programs on mag-
netic tape are concerned, the ideas are not ascertainable without a print-out of the
work in visual form. If an intelligible copy could not be made, such a medium of
expression could be substantially maintained in secrecy. Therefore, one of the basic
purposes of the copyright laws will not be fulfilled unless one can make an intelligi-
ble copy to ascertain its contents.
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835, Serial No. 8, Part
3, at 1898 (statement of Electronics Industries Association). Modern “functional program-
ming” languages such as Haskell make the Association’s analogy between computer programs
and “mathematical formulas” literally true; all such programs are formally expressed as mathe-
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thermore, the draft’s omission of any provision specifically addressing the
legality of using a computer to analyze copyrighted works also drew criti-
cism from scientific experts.26
Thus, not later than the mid-1960s, two disputed issues surrounding
copyright law and computer technology had emerged: first, should computer
programs receive protection under copyright as a form of literary work, or
via some other approach more narrowly focused on the unique characteris-
tics of software? And second, should the use of computer technology to aid
in the study and analysis of expressive works fall within the purview of the
new statute? The novelty and uncertainty of these questions prompted calls
for Congress to study the matter further before legislating.27 As Professor
Benjamin Kaplan recognized, for example, the question was not merely the
proper reach of copyright protection for software, but whether copyright
should apply at all in view of the functional characteristics of software
“works.”28
So as not to delay the broader reform bill that would become the Copy-
right Act of 1976,29 Congress on December 31, 1974 created the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(“CONTU”).30 The thirteen-member Commission was directed “to study and
matical functions that return a result. See, e.g., Richard Bird, THINKING FUNCTIONALLY WITH
HASKELL 1 (2014).
26. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 597, Part 1,
at 581–89 (statement of Prof. Anthony G. Oettinger of the Association for Computing
Machinery).
27. Id. at 193–96 (statement of Prof. Arthur R. Miller). Interestingly, in his statement,
Prof. Miller also stated that the functional attributes of computer programs should disentitle
them to copyright protection. Id. at 196–97. His later service on the CONTU Commission
persuaded him to the contrary, however. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
28. See Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright: Proposals and Prospects,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 831, 843 (1966) (“A suspicion, indeed, that we ought to be thinking not
copyright but patent or perhaps a third quiddity, arises as we are told that the programs, or
some of them, can be translated, so to speak, into physical parts of the computer’s machinery
or circuitry.”).
29. Other scholars have noted the generally unfavorable consequences of the timing of
the software copyright debate on policy: software emerged as a contentious issue when negoti-
ations over copyright revision were well advanced, leading Congress to shunt the issue to one
side rather than address it forthrightly in the 1976 Act. Furthermore, because legal issues
surrounding software arose when the industry was in its relative infancy, they rested upon a
nascent understanding that later developments have called into question. See, e.g., Peter S.
Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of
Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2893192,
manuscript at 12 (“The software protection controversy emerged at an inopportune time.”); id.
at 12–15 (summarizing CONTU’s work); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case
Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984
DUKE L.J. 663, 694 (“It is possible to ask whether Congress was fully informed of the implica-
tions of the decision before it was made”).
30. See Pub. L. No. 93-573, §§ 201–208, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873–75 (1974). The Commis-
sion had been proposed as early as 1967, and legislation had cleared the Senate, but the House
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compile data” concerning both the questions stated above, and to “make rec-
ommendations” to Congress for further legislative action within three
years.31 Congress and the Copyright Office expressed hope that the forma-
tion of the CONTU Commission would permit the remainder of the reform
legislation to proceed, postponing for a later date the difficult questions that
the Commission was tasked with addressing.32
As finally enacted on October 19, 1976 (with an effective date of Janu-
ary 1, 1978), the new Copyright Act essentially echoed the position the Cop-
yright Office had taken on the 1965 bill: the legislative history declared
Congress’s intent that software should be treated as analogous to a “literary
work,” which the statutory language weakly buttressed by including “tapes,
disks, or cards” as examples of media in which a literary work could be
“fixed.”33 The only statutory language expressly referencing computers sim-
ply preserved the law as it existed under the 1909 Act.34 The legislative
took no action until it began to become clear that uncertainty over computer issues was poten-
tially impeding action on other areas where substantial agreement had already been achieved.
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 48, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5661.
31. Id. §§ 201, 206, 88 Stat. at 1873–74, 1875. Many scholars have articulated (often,
but not uniformly, critical) evaluations of CONTU’s work. Examples include Arthur R. Miller,
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is
Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977 (1993); Paul Goldstein, Infringement of
Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1119, 1119–22 (1985); Samuelson,
supra note 29.
32. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 93-1581, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6849, 6854–55.
33. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2543 (1976) (definition of “literary works”).
The legislative history explained:
The term “literary works” does not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualita-
tive value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual, reference, or instruc-
tional works and compilations of data. It also includes computer data bases, and
computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the program-
mer’s expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 30, at 37 (emphasis added). The statute’s exclusion of
“procedure[s], process[es], system[s], [and] method[s] of operation” from the scope of protect-
able subject matter, the report continued, was meant to clarify that “the expression adopted by
the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual
processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright law.”
Id. at 38; see also Michael S. Keplinger, Computer Intellectual Property Claims: Computer
Software and Data Base Protection, 1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 463 (crediting this language
with preventing “monopolization of the processes or algorithms embodied in a program” under
copyright law); Goldstein, supra note 31, at 1125 (“You need only contrast section 102(b)’s
statement of what copyright does not protect with the same Act’s definition of ‘computer
program,’ to appreciate how very thin, indeed, is the infringement protection available to com-
puter software.”). Many courts, however, have given section 102(b) far less weight as a limita-
tion on the reach of copyright protection for software than Congress intended. See Pamela
Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protec-
tion, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1961–69 (2007).
34. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. at 2565 (“this title does not afford to the owner of
copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunc-
tion with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring informa-
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history stated that the statute’s extension of existing law was meant simply
to give the CONTU Commission time to complete its study and to make
recommendations for further legislation, while reiterating Congress’s view
that software itself was a proper subject of copyright protection.35
B. CONTU and its Aftermath
CONTU transmitted its final report to Congress on July 31, 1978. Over
a strong dissent, the majority recommended that Congress amend the Copy-
right Act “to make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent that they
embody an author’s original creation, are proper subject matter of copy-
right.”36 The Commission found that, because “[t]he cost of developing com-
puter programs is far greater than the cost of their duplication,” software
would likely be underproduced absent sufficient legal protection or other
mechanisms to permit software developers to recoup their costs.37 This rea-
soning persuaded the Commission “that some form of protection is neces-
sary to encourage the creation and broad distribution of computer programs
in a competitive market.”38
Although the Commission declared itself to be “unanimous in its belief
that computer programs are entitled to legal protection,” though “the una-
nimity has not extended to the precise form that protection should take.”39
Multiple legal doctrines might be invoked to protect software, the Commis-
sion continued, including “patent and copyright—exclusively federal statu-
tory methods; trade secret law—derived from statutory and judicial state
law; and unfair competition—based on elements of common law and federal
statute.”40 The CONTU majority chose copyright law as the proper vehicle
partly for historical reasons, and partly by simple process of elimination.
tion, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to
works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on
December 31, 1977”) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. I 1977)). Congress’s choice to pre-
serve the 1909 Act during the period of the Commission’s study was deliberate—the product
of compromise between computer industry participants (who sought temporary immunity from
liability during the Commission’s deliberations) and publishers’ representatives (who sought to
apply the 1976 statute to electronic reproductions immediately). See Melville B. Nimmer,
Foreword: Two Copyright Crises, 15 UCLA L. REV. 931, 932–33 (1968).
35. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 30, at 116 (“The Commission on New Techno-
logical Uses is, among other things, now engaged in making a thorough study of the emerging
patterns in this field and it will, on the basis of its findings, recommend definitive copyright
provisions to deal with the situation”; but “[w]ith respect to the copyrightability of computer
programs, the ownership of copyrights in them, the terms of protection, and the formal require-
ments of the remainder of the bill, the new statute would apply.”), 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5731.
36. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
37. Id. at 11.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 12.
40. Id. (footnote omitted).
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First, essentially agreeing with the Copyright Office’s 1965 rationale as
reiterated in the legislative history of the 1976 Act, CONTU declared that
the historical expansion of copyrightable subject matter “has already encom-
passed computer programs” as a form of “literary work” protected “from the
moment it is fixed.”41
Next, the Commission compared the possibility of copyrighting
software with other possible forms of legal protection. Patent law, for exam-
ple, presented an alternative that software developers might find “more at-
tractive than copyright” due to its stronger statutory monopoly.42 But “[t]he
acquisition of a patent, however, is time consuming and expensive. . . and
the legal hurdles an applicant must overcome are high.”43 Seemingly hostile
language in then-existing Supreme Court case law, in the Commission’s
view, also cast doubt upon the patent-eligibility of software.44 The alterna-
tive of trade secrecy, the Commission found, fitted poorly with works, such
as mass-market commercial software, “that contain the secret and are de-
signed to be widely distributed.”45 The lack of national uniformity in both
trade secret and unfair competition law, which ultimately rested upon prem-
ises that varied from state to state, also made these options less attractive to
the Commission.46
The CONTU majority then responded to the criticism that extending
copyright protection to software works would slow technological develop-
ment by requiring wasteful duplication of programmers’ efforts. Given the
Copyright Act’s exclusion of “processes and methods” from the scope of
protection, and the long-settled principle that copyright in a work does not
prevent reuse of the ideas contained in that work by others, the Commission
concluded that “copyright protection for programs does not threaten to block
the use of ideas or program language previously developed by others when
that use is necessary to achieve a certain result.”47 Responding to criticism
that protecting software was tantamount to copyrighting a machine or other
functional article, the majority declared that copyright simply meant that
computer “users may not take the works of others to operate their ma-
chines. . . . one is always free to make the machine do the same thing as it
41. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted); cf. supra notes 22, 33 and accompanying text.
42. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16–17.
43. Id. at 17. The Commission also noted, a bit obliquely, the risk of possible overpro-
tection of software under patent law, because a patent would bar the reuse by other program-
mers even of methods and ideas embedded in prior software that copyright law, in contrast,
would leave available for others to reuse. Id. at 20.
44. Id. at 17 (“It is still unclear whether a patent may ever be obtained for a computer
program.”).
45. Id. (footnote omitted).
46. Id. at 17–18.
47. Id. at 20; see also id. at 18–19 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), and Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879)); cf. supra note 33 (noting divergence of opinion over how much constraining
force Section 102(b) actually exerts on the reach of software copyright protection).
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would if it had the copyrighted [software] placed in it, but only by one’s own
creative effort rather than by piracy.”48 Nevertheless, the CONTU majority
conceded, “[i]t is difficult, either as a matter of legal interpretation or tech-
nological determination, to draw the line between the copyrightable element
of style and expression in a computer program and the process which under-
lies it.”49 This difficulty would come to bedevil the courts called upon to
construe the scope of copyright protection in software, as discussed below.
Commissioner John Hersey, joined by Commissioner Rhoda Karpatkin,
dissented from the majority’s recommendation.50 Hersey agreed with the
majority that “the investment of creative effort in the devising of computer
programs does warrant certain modes of protection of the resulting de-
vices[.]”51 Extending copyright protection to software, however, “would
mark the first time copyright had ever covered a means of communication,
not with the human mind and senses, but with machines.”52 A computer
program, Commissioner Hersey wrote, was “a machine-control element, a
mechanical device, having no purpose beyond being engaged in a computer
to do mechanical work.”53 That the “machine” being controlled was elec-
tronic rather than mechanically based, he believed, made no difference to the
essentially functional, utilitarian nature of software. Software was not
merely a description of steps that would, if implemented, accomplish a cer-
tain result; it was rather a device that itself produced that result: “[w]hen
activated, it does the work.”54 Commissioner Hersey also believed that copy-
right protection was unnecessary to provide an adequate incentive for the
creation and dissemination of expressive works.55 Turning next to the legis-
lative record, Commissioner Hersey disputed the CONTU majority’s conclu-
sion that software copyright was already a fait accompli under the language
48. Id. at 21.
49. Id. at 22.
50. Commissioner Melville Nimmer also expressed some sympathy with Hersey’s
views; and, according to Commissioner Karpatkin, they had also been shared by Commis-
sioner William Dix, who died before the completion of the Commission’s inquiry. See id. at
26–27 (Nimmer), 37–38 (Karpatkin).
51. Id. at 27.
52. Id. at 28. Copyright, in Hersey’s view, was an appropriate form of protection only
for works “intelligible to a human being.” Id. at 29.
53. Id. at 28.
54. Id.; see also id. (“[p]rinted instructions explain how to do something; programs are
able to do it.”) (emphasis in original); cf. supra note 4 (noting that this characterization is
broadly shared).
55. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 30 (“It appears that the existing network of
technological, contractual, nondisclosure, trade-secret, common-law misappropriation, and (in
a few instances) patent forms of protection. . . will be wholly adequate, as they apparently have
been up to now, to the needs of developers.”); see also, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case
for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REV. 281, 344 (1970) (emphasizing that early software developers believed copy-
right protection to be immaterial to their work).
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of the 1976 Act.56 Instead, Commissioner Hersey concluded, Congress
should expressly exclude “a computer program in the form in which it is
capable of being used to control computer operations” from the scope of
subject matter eligible for copyright protection.57
Congress adopted the CONTU majority’s recommendations, essentially
unchanged, in 1980.58 The new statute added to the Copyright Act a defini-
tion of “computer program” that reads today just as written in 1980: “a
‘computer program’ is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”59 And,
striking out the 1976 Act’s placeholder language preserving the force of the
1909 Act, the 1980 law added two exceptions describing particular circum-
stances in which the use of a copyrighted work in a computer would be
deemed noninfringing.60 The very brief legislative history explained that the
statute “embodies the recommendations of the Commission on New Techno-
logical Uses of Copyrighted Works with respect to clarifying the law of
copyright of computer software.”61
Remarkably, however, the 1980 amendment nowhere expressly declares
software to be copyrightable, although extending such protection was un-
doubtedly Congress’s intent. The amendment’s new definition of “computer
program” remains syntactically unmoored from the provisions of the Copy-
right Act defining copyrightable subject matter. Section 102(a) does not in-
clude “computer programs” among its enumerated categories of the subject
matter eligible for copyright protection, and even Congress’s apparent inten-
tion to subsume programs within the statutory definition of “literary works”
is not reflected in the language of the amendment.62 Instead, the 1980
amendment seems to have extended copyright protection to software by im-
plication: the statute as amended declares that computer programs contain
“statements or instructions,” suggesting (without stating) that they fall
within the statute’s definition of “literary works” in that they are “expressed
56. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 31 (“The legislative history of the new law
can give little comfort to any who would suggest that a thoughtful legislative judgment had
been made about the propriety of copyright protection for computer programs.”); cf. supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
57. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
58. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028–29 (1980).
59. Id. at 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101).
60. Id. at 3028–29 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117); cf. supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
61. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, Part 1, at 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6482.
62. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (2012); see also Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the
Law of Software Copyright, 10 HIGH TECH. L. J. 1, 6 n.25 (1995) (“CONTU did not, however,
add computer programs to the list of protectable works, instead considering them to be both
literary and audiovisual works.”). Although the conception of software as a form of literary
work recurs frequently in the legislative history of the 1976 Act, this assumption appears never
to have been reflected in the actual statutory language. See, e.g., supra notes 20, 22, 33 and
accompanying text.
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in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia.”63
Again, it seems clear that Congress believed that the 1980 amendments ei-
ther extended copyright protection to software or reconfirmed that such pro-
tection already existed.64 The legislature, however, surely could have
anticipated that extending copyright through an implied analogy, rather than
addressing the scope and limitations of copyright forthrightly in statutory
text, would cause enduring analytical problems for the courts.
C. The Early Cases
The CONTU report’s forecast of continuing interpretive difficulty
swiftly proved to be more prescient than Congress’s hope that the 1980 stat-
ute would “clarify the law.” To be sure, the literal, exact duplication of a
copyrighted program in its entirety posed no great analytical difficulties for
the courts.65 Far more challenging, however, was the question whether in-
fringement resulted when a later program was written to mimic the function-
ality of an earlier program without copying the earlier program’s own source
or object code. Patent protection, of course, would bar the second comer
from implementing the same functionality as the earlier program; but the
more difficult question was whether copyright law would yield the same
result.
Courts applying the 1980 statute enunciated an assortment of incompati-
ble standards for measuring the reach of copyright in the nonliteral elements
of a computer program, the imitation of which by another programmer
would constitute infringement.66 The Third Circuit in Whelan Associates,
63. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definitions of “computer program” and “literary works”). Com-
pare this relatively oblique language with the far more straightforward declaration in the
TRIPS Agreement, adopted fifteen years later, that “[c]omputer programs, whether in source
or object code, shall be protected as literary works[.]” Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 10(1).
The 1980 revisions to Section 117 also describe the reach of software copyright in a curiously
inverted fashion, providing that “it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a com-
puter program to make. . . another copy” in some circumstances, inviting the negative infer-
ence that copying in other circumstances would be infringing. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a); Stephen
Kyle Tapp & Daniel E. Wanat, Computer Software Copyright Issues: Section 117 and Fair
Use, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 197, 214 (1992) (recognizing this issue); Richard H. Stern,
Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software: Did the 1980 Act Do Anything for Object
Code?, 3 COMPUTER/L.J. 1, 8 (1981) (same).
64. See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982)
(declaring, perhaps optimistically, that “the copyrightability of computer programs is firmly
established after the 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act”).
65. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983).
66. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Legal Protection for Software: Still a Work in
Progress, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 445, 447–49 (2002) (describing different courts’ method-
ologies for addressing nonliteral infringement); Lloyd G. Farr, Sega v. Accolade: Another
Generation of Computer Program Copyright Cases Has Growing Pains, 27 GA. L. REV. 903,
917–25 (1993) (assessing early post-CONTU decisions).
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Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. stated that the relevant question was
whether a computer program contained any expressive content not “neces-
sary” to enable the program to serve the purpose for which it was written; if
so, such content was protected by copyright:
Just as Baker v. Selden focused on the end sought to be achieved by
Selden’s book, the line between idea and expression may be drawn
with reference to the end sought to be achieved by the work in ques-
tion. In other words, the purpose or function of a utilitarian work
would be the work’s idea, and everything that is not necessary to
that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the
idea.67
The test, in the court’s view, was whether there were “various means of
achieving the desired purpose”; if so, “then the particular means chosen is
not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.”68 Apply-
ing this test to the program before it, the court found that the only unprotect-
able element of the plaintiff’s software was the particular purpose for which
it was written. Because that purpose could have been implemented in a vari-
ety of ways using several software techniques, the particular means chosen
by the plaintiff was broadly protectable.69
Expressly rejecting Whelan, however, the Fifth Circuit in Plains Cotton
Cooperative Association v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc.70enunciated
a far stricter standard for identifying protectable expressive elements within
a computer program. The two programs in Plains Cotton shared many orga-
nizational similarities, the court recognized, but these were “dictated by the
externalities of the cotton market” that both programs were written to
serve.71 The court found that “[t]he record supports the inference that market
factors play a significant role in determining the sequence and organization
of cotton marketing software, and we decline to hold that those patterns
cannot constitute ‘ideas’ in a computer context.”72 Plains Cotton thus nar-
rowed the universe of protected elements within a computer program from
the broad view of Whelan: elements dictated by “market factors” were un-
67. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986) (citation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 1236 n.28 (“the idea of the Dentalab program was the efficient manage-
ment of a dental laboratory (which presumably has significantly different requirements from
those of other businesses). Because that idea could be accomplished in a number of different
ways with a number of different structures, the structure of the Dentalab program is part of the
program’s expression, not its idea.”).
70. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n v. Goodpasture Comput. Serv., Inc. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir. 1987); see also id. at 1262 (declining to follow Whelan).
71. Id. at 1262.
72. Id.
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protectable even if they could have been implemented by the defendant in
ways that differed from the plaintiff’s.
After Whelan and Plains Cotton, the courts struggled for a few years to
enunciate a single test that would differentiate the uncopyrightable elements
of a computer program from those the law protected. Some courts, following
Whelan, extended fairly broad copyright protection to computer software.73
Other cases echoed Plains Cotton’s observation that software elements
drafted to meet market needs, rather than to serve expressive purposes,
would necessarily fall outside the coverage of copyright law.74 Adding to the
confusion, the Fifth Circuit itself seemed to retreat from Plains Cotton in
later cases.75
Commentators, too, were divided. Some argued that the Whelan test
overprotected software by failing to exclude subsidiary “ideas” embedded
within the program (but not commanded by its purpose) from the scope of
protection.76 Others celebrated Whelan for providing reassurance to the still-
emerging commercial software industry that investments in software devel-
opment would be rewarded with broad legal protections.77 Professor Arthur
Miller, who served on the CONTU Commission, hailed Whelan as the well-
spring of all subsequent cases, and attempted to show that even cases that
had claimed to differ from Whelan were actually consistent with it.78
D. From Altai to Oracle
In Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., the Second Cir-
cuit sought to resolve the Whelan/Plains Cotton debate by returning to first
73. See, e.g., Autoskill Inc. v. National Educational Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476,
1495 n.23 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) limited the scope of
copyright in nonliteral elements of computer software), rev’d in part on other grounds, TW
Telecom Holdings Inc. v. Carolina Internet Ltd., 661 F.3d 495 (10th Cir. 2011); Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 54–58 (D. Mass. 1990).
74. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1023–25 (N.D.
Cal. 1992); Micro Consulting, Inc. v. Zubeldia, 813 F. Supp. 1514, 1528 (W.D. Okl. 1990).
75. See Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1341–42
(5th Cir. 1994); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 536 & n.20
(5th Cir. 1994).
76. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 33, at 1967; Lemley, supra note 62, at 10–12; Peter
S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1084–85 (1989); J. Dianne Brinson, Copyrighted Software: Separating
the Protected Expression from Unprotected Ideas, A Starting Point, 29 B.C. L. REV. 803,
850–55 (1988).
77. See Anthony L. Clapes, et al., Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the
Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1493
(1987).
78. See Miller, supra note 31, at 997–1013. Professor Miller’s article recognized forth-
rightly that his CONTU service had led him to rethink his early opposition to copyrighting
software, although his quotations from his own prior testimony to Congress selectively empha-
sized his concerns concerning educational use of copyrighted works rather than copyrighting
software as such. Compare id. at 981–82 n.10 with Miller, supra note 27.
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principles.79 The “question of whether and to what extent the ‘non-literal’
aspects of a computer program, that is, those aspects that are not reduced to
written code, are protected by copyright law,” in the court’s view, could be
answered by referring to “long-standing doctrines of copyright law” based
on Congress’s apparent command to treat software as a form of protected
“literary work.”80 Treating software as a form of “literary work” implicated
copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy and the conventional limits on copy-
right protection for useful articles or functional works, as well as the copy-
right statute’s express exclusion of “process[es], procedure[s], system[s], or
method[s] of operation” from the scope of protected subject matter.81 The
court found Whelan to provide limited guidance on those issues because it
interpreted the unprotected “idea” of a computer program too narrowly. In
the court’s words:
The leading commentator in the field has stated that “[t]he crucial
flaw in [Whelan’s] reasoning is that it assumes that only one ‘idea,’
in copyright law terms, underlies any computer program, and that
once a separable idea can be identified, everything else must be ex-
pression.” 3 Nimmer § 13.03(F), at 13-62.34. This criticism focuses
not upon the program’s ultimate purpose but upon the reality of its
structural design. As we have already noted, a computer program’s
ultimate function or purpose is the composite result of interacting
subroutines. Since each subroutine is itself a program, and thus,
may be said to have its own “idea,” Whelan’s general formulation
that a program’s overall purpose equates with the program’s idea
is descriptively inadequate.82
Instead, the Altai court enunciated “a three-step procedure, based on the
abstractions test utilized by the district court, in order to determine whether
the non-literal elements of two or more computer programs are substantially
similar.”83 The court’s three steps were:
1. Abstraction. First, the court must “dissect the allegedly copied
program’s structure and isolate each level of abstraction con-
tained within it. This process begins with the code and ends
with an articulation of the program’s ultimate function. Along
the way, it is necessary essentially to retrace and map each of
79. Comput. Ass’n Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 697-01 (2d Cir. 1992).
80. Id. at 702.
81. Id. at 702–07.
82. Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 706.
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the designer’s steps—in the opposite order in which they were
taken during the program’s creation.”84
2. Filtration. Next, the Altai court directed, courts must undertake
a “‘successive filtering method’” to search “each level of ab-
straction” identified in the preceding step for subject matter ly-
ing outside the scope of the author’s copyright.85 The filtration
process excluded several types of material from the scope of the
program’s copyright. First, the court said, “elements dictated by
efficiency” must be filtered out. Those elements lay on the
“idea” side of copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy and were
also subject to the copyright’s doctrine of merger, which denies
protection to expression that is necessary to permit an idea to be
communicated. Quoting the CONTU report, the court explained
that:
[C]opyrighted language may be copied without infringing
when there is but a limited number of ways to express a
given idea. . .. In the computer context, this means that
when specific instructions, even though previously copy-
righted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing
a given task, their later use by another will not amount to
infringement.86
Even Whelan, the Altai court recognized, had effectively en-
dorsed application of the merger doctrine in principle, despite
its reliance on the possibility of expressive variation in pro-
gramming code.87 Second, Altai directed courts to “filter out”
84. Id. at 707. As an illustration of this approach, the court approvingly quoted from a
student author’s description of the different levels of abstraction that coexisted within software
works:
At the lowest level of abstraction, a computer program may be thought of in its
entirety as a set of individual instructions organized into a hierarchy of modules. At
a higher level of abstraction, the instructions in the lowest-level modules may be
replaced conceptually by the functions of those modules. At progressively higher
levels of abstraction, the functions of higher-level modules conceptually replace the
implementations of those modules in terms of lower-level modules and instructions,
until finally, one is left with nothing but the ultimate function of the program. . .. A
program has structure at every level of abstraction at which it is viewed. At low
levels of abstraction, a program’s structure may be quite complex; at the highest
level it is trivial.
Id. (quoting Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining
the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV.
866, 897–98 (1990)).
85. Altai, 982 F.2d at 701.
86. Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
87. See id. at 708 (“While, hypothetically, there might be a myriad of ways in which a
programmer may effectuate certain functions within a program, —i.e., express the idea em-
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“elements dictated by external factors”—a term that Altai used
more broadly than Plains Cotton’s reference to uncopyrightable
program components driven by “market factors.”88 In the con-
text of software, this meant that infringement could not be
based upon similarities between two programs that were attrib-
utable to “(1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on
which a particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility
requirements of other programs with which a program is de-
signed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’
design standards; (4) demands of the industry being serviced;
and (5) widely accepted programming practices within the com-
puter industry.”89 Finally, the court directed, “elements taken
from the public domain” must be “filtered out” of the plaintiff’s
work before comparing it with the defendant’s work. Public do-
main material “is free for the taking and cannot be appropriated
by a single author even though it is included in a copyrighted
work.”90
3. Comparison. After “filtering out” unprotected content at
each level of abstraction contained within the work, the Al-
tai court concluded,
there may remain a core of protectable expression. In
terms of a work’s copyright value, this is the golden
nugget. At this point, the court’s substantial similarity
inquiry focuses on whether the defendant copied any
aspect of this protected expression, as well as an as-
sessment of the copied portion’s relative importance
with respect to the plaintiff’s overall program.91
The Altai court’s three-step analysis drew mostly, but not uniformly,
favorable reviews from copyright experts. The Nimmer treatise, which ar-
bodied in a given subroutine—efficiency concerns may so narrow the practical range of choice
as to make only one or two forms of expression workable options.”) (citation omitted).
88. See id. at 709–10; cf. supra note 72 and accompanying text.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 711. As an example, the court cited “elements of a computer program that
have entered the public domain by virtue of freely accessible program exchanges and the like.”
Id. One might quarrel with the court’s perception of an equivalency between a program being
“freely accessible” and the program’s status as a public domain work; under the 1976 Act,
copyright protection attaches the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression,
and the fact that the work may thereafter become widely available is irrelevant to its public-
domain status. Free and open-source software works, to be sure, are distributed under licenses
that grant broad reuse rights (similar to public-domain works), but even open-source software
remains protected by copyright, and reuse of the software beyond the extent permitted by the
license may be infringing. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also
infra notes 222–224 and accompanying text (discussing free and open-source software).
91. Altai, 982 F.2d at 710 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Spring 2018] Symbols, Systems, and Software as Intellectual Property 151
ticulated its own version of the analysis from which Altai drew, championed
the court’s reasoning, noting that “[o]ther courts have subsequently followed
Altai’s lead, so that this filtration test may now be regarded as the dominant,
albeit not universal, standard.”92 The Patry treatise, on the other hand, criti-
cized the “formidable” burdens the Altai analysis requires of nonspecialist
district judges, while also emphasizing tensions between prior case law on
the one hand, and Altai’s use of both copyright’s merger doctrine and amor-
phous concepts such as “efficiency” on the other.93 The Altai analysis has
been enduringly influential, however, both in the courts and in the academic
analysis of software copyright issues.94
The First Circuit added its own criticism of Altai in Lotus Development
Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.95 The question in Lotus was whether the
names and hierarchical structure of menu commands in a spreadsheet pro-
gram were themselves protectable under copyright, a question the Lotus
court answered in the negative.96 The court rejected Lotus’s request to con-
duct an Altai abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis of its menu com-
mand names, for essentially two reasons. First, the court declared, because
Lotus, unlike Altai, was a case involving allegations of literal infringement
of the copyrighted work, the Altai analysis (which allowed a finding of in-
fringement even in the absence of literal copying) was inapposite.97 Second,
and more importantly, the Lotus court warned, Altai itself presupposed the
existence of some level of copyrightable expression within the work—a pre-
sumption that may lead courts astray when the question before them was
whether the plaintiff’s work was copyrightable at all. In the court’s words:
In fact, we think that the Altai test in this context may actually be
misleading because, in instructing courts to abstract the various
92. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F] (2015) (internal quotations omitted) (footnotes
omitted).
93. 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:87 (2015); see also William F. Patry, Copyright and
Computer Programs: It’s All in the Definition, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 55 (1996)
(concluding that Altai’s analysis “is overly complicated, and has been of practical assistance to
only one type of person, the expert witness, whose services are essential for the detailed analy-
sis of the programmer’s creative process that the court’s test requires.”).
94. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright In-
fringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1843 (2013) (footnote omitted) (showing that “[s]everal
courts have, in fact, adopted an Altai-like filtration test in thin copyright nonsoftware cases.”);
Lemley, supra note 62, at 14–17.
95. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F.3d 806 (1st Cir.
1995).
96. See id. at 815–19 (reasoning that Lotus’s menu command hierarchy was a “method
of operation” of Lotus’s program and therefore expressly excluded from copyright protection
under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
97. See id. at 815 (“While the Altai test may provide a useful framework for assessing
the alleged nonliteral copying of computer code, we find it to be of little help in assessing
whether the literal copying of a menu command hierarchy constitutes copyright
infringement.”).
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levels, it seems to encourage them to find a base level that includes
copyrightable subject matter that, if literally copied, would make the
copier liable for copyright infringement. While that base (or literal)
level would not be at issue in a nonliteral-copying case like Altai, it
is precisely what is at issue in this appeal. We think that abstracting
menu command hierarchies down to their individual word and menu
levels and then filtering idea from expression at that stage, as both
the Altai and the district court tests require, obscures the more fun-
damental question of whether a menu command hierarchy can be
copyrighted at all. The initial inquiry should not be whether individ-
ual components of a menu command hierarchy are expressive, but
rather whether the menu command hierarchy as a whole can be
copyrighted.98
Lotus’s critique of Altai thus parallels Altai’s own criticism of Whelan in an
important respect. In each instance, the later court said, the earlier court’s
analysis leads to potential overprotection of software under copyright law by
confining its analysis in a way that disregards some of the law’s built-in
limiting principles (the idea-expression dichotomy in Whelan, according to
Altai; and the statutory exception for “methods of operation” in Altai, ac-
cording to Lotus).
Regardless of these criticisms of Altai, as Professor Samuelson has ob-
served, “[a]pplication of [Altai’s] abstraction-filtration-comparison test gen-
erally results in programs having thin copyright protection.”99 “After Altai,
courts became more openly skeptical about claims of copyright protection
for the ‘look and feel’ of programs, as such claims typically sought to pro-
tect the now unprotected utilitarian aspects of programs.”100 The compara-
tively limited scope of copyright protection available post-Altai coincided
with the Federal Circuit’s rising acceptance of the patent alternative, which
both that court and the CONTU report had previously rejected.101
More recently, however, another court has given software far more ex-
pansive copyright protection than the Altai analysis might suggest is appro-
priate. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.102 involved a claim of copyright
infringement in the “declaring code” for thirty-seven software packages
written by Oracle’s predecessor-in-interest for use by programmers develop-
ing software in the Java programming language. Some of the packages pro-
vided “core” functionality that programmers were required to adopt “in
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1746, 1770 (2011).
100. Id. at 1771 (footnote omitted).
101. See id. at n.213 & 1775.
102. Oracle America, Inc. & Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (hereinafter
Oracle II).
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order to make any worthwhile use of the [Java] language.”103 The challenged
“declaring code” for each of the packages supplied with Java “introduces the
method body and specifies very precisely the inputs, name, and other func-
tionality” provided by those packages.104 Each of the Java packages at issue
also included lengthier “implementing code” that actually “gives the com-
puter the step-by-step instructions for carrying out the declared function,”105
but the implementing code was not in issue in the parties’ dispute; Google
wrote its own code to implement the functionality of the Java packages, but
gave its counterpart the same method and variable names defined in Oracle’s
own Java “declaring code.”106 A jury found that Google had infringed Ora-
cle’s copyright in the Java API declaring code, but the district judge partially
granted Google’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that
Oracle’s software was not protected by copyright.107
The Court of Appeals reversed. It agreed with the parties that the Sec-
ond Circuit’s Altai opinion supplied the governing analytical framework.108
The Federal Circuit’s version of the Altai inquiry, however, seems quite dif-
ferent from Altai’s own. In particular, Oracle treated the “filtration” analysis
as relevant only to the question of infringement, not as to the reach of copy-
right protection in the plaintiff’s program.109 (The court’s opinion does not
103. Id. at 1349 (quoting Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (hereinafter Oracle I) aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2014)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1349.
106. The court stated:
Google copied the declaring source code from the 37 Java API packages verbatim,
inserting that code into parts of its Android software. In doing so, Google copied the
elaborately organized taxonomy of all the names of methods, classes, interfaces, and
packages—the overall system of organized names—covering 37 packages, with
over six hundred classes, with over six thousand methods. . .. It is undisputed, how-
ever, that Google wrote its own implementing code. . ..
Id. at 1350–51 (quoting Oracle II, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 999.).
107. Oracle II, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 974. The parties had agreed to have the question of
copyrightability vel non decided by the district judge; the jury, accordingly, was instructed “to
assume that the structure, sequence, and organization of the 37 API packages was copyright-
able.” Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1351. This procedural division of responsibility seems in some
respects to have clouded the court’s analysis on appeal, for some of the issues the parties had
apparently consented to have the district judge resolve were instead declared on appeal to
present jury issues.
108. The Federal Circuit applied Ninth Circuit law to the copyright issues in the parties’
cross-appeals. Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1353. It then noted that the Ninth Circuit had embraced
the Altai abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis in software copyright cases. Id. at 1357
(citing, inter alia, Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992)).
109. See id. at 1358. Altai itself did not appear to require evaluation of the defendant’s
own work, as distinct from the plaintiff’s, as part of the filtration analysis, although the court’s
opinion is less than perfectly clear on this point. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying
text. Some other courts, too, require software copyright holders to identify with particularity
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indicate whether the jury, which was tasked with resolving the infringement
issue, was instructed that it must consider the doctrines, such as merger and
sce`nes-a`-faire, that the appeals court declared to be relevant only at that
stage of the analysis.) Indeed, the crucial element of the Oracle court’s anal-
ysis derives not from Altai, but from the Third Circuit’s Whelan decision,
which Altai expressly rejected: as Whelan did, the Oracle court declares
software broadly copyrightable because of the possibility that a programmer
could have employed alternative forms of expressing the ideas embedded
therein.110
Oracle discussed many of the same copyright principles that the Altai
court had relied on. In virtually every case, however, the Oracle court con-
cluded that those principles either did not apply or were relevant only to the
question of infringement rather than to the reach of copyright protection.
The doctrine of merger, for example, which both Altai and the CONTU Re-
port had cited as a basis for withholding copyright protection from “specific
[software] instructions. . . [that] are the only and essential means of accom-
plishing a given task,” was irrelevant because Oracle could have chosen
many different names for the methods and variables defined in its Java API
packages.111 Similarly, copyright’s rule against extending protection to indi-
vidual words and short phrases, the court reasoned, could not limit the scope
of copyright in Oracle’s declaring code because its size—7,000 lines in to-
tal—was far longer than works previously denied protection on this basis.112
The doctrine of sce`nes-a`-faire, which Altai had used to justify withholding
copyright protection from several different aspects of computer programs,
failed to protect Google essentially because the question had not been ade-
quately briefed, and in addition because of the possibility that Oracle might
have expressed its declaring code in many different ways.113
those portions of their programs that are protectable (and not excluded from protection by
doctrines such as merger or sce`nes-a`-faire) prior to engaging in any comparison with the
alleged infringing work. See, e.g., Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison, 758 F.3d 1198, 1205–08
(10th Cir. 2014) (even analysis of literal copying must begin by “abstracting” and filtering out
those portions of the copied code that are unprotectable); Automated Solutions Corp. v. Para-
gon Data Sys., 756 F.3d 504, 518–21 (6th Cir. 2014).
110. Compare supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text with Oracle II, 750 F.3d at
1361 (“[t]he evidence showed that Oracle had ‘unlimited options as to the selection and ar-
rangement of the 7000 lines Google copied’ ”) (quoting Brief for Appellant at 50, Oracle II,
750 F.3d 1339 (Nos. 2013–1021, 2013–1022); id. at 1368 (finding Oracle’s declaring code
copyrightable because “the declaring code could have been written and organized in any num-
ber of ways”); cf. supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (summarizing Altai court’s cri-
tique of Whelan on this point).
111. See Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1360-61.
112. See generally id. at 1362–63. The court at this point in its opinion appears to treat
Oracle’s Java declaring code as a single work of 7,000 lines, rather than 7,000 declarations
each expressed in one line of code. See id. This characterization would have been highly
relevant to the quantum of damages if Oracle had prevailed in the lawsuit. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c)(1) (2012).
113. See Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1363–64; cf. supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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Although the district court had also relied on the First Circuit’s decision
in Lotus, the appellate court found Lotus to be incompatible with Altai—
although it did so without addressing the reasons Lotus gave for not using
the abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis to evaluate a menu command
hierarchy.114 Finally, the appeals court declared “irrelevant to copyright-
ability” Google’s arguments that copying of the Java API declaring code
was essential to create a product that was interoperable with the large in-
stalled Java code base.115
Oracle remains a fairly recent decision that has yet to be broadly applied
by other courts or treated in depth by commentators.116 Following a new trial
on remand, a jury found Google’s use to be noninfringing under the fair use
doctrine,117 prompting a new appeal by Oracle that remains pending at the
time of this writing.118 The previous appellate opinion’s impact on the law
and on software development, accordingly, remains uncertain.119 It is surely
114. See Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1365–66; cf. supra note 98 and accompanying text. In-
deed, the Oracle case involved the very scenario that Lotus warned would lead courts to over-
protect software under copyright law, making the Oracle opinion’s decision not to even
describe (much less to distinguish) the Lotus opinion’s reasoning on this point doubly
puzzling.
115. Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1368. But see Clark D. Asay, Copyright’s Technological
Interdependencies, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 189, 232–33 (2015) (noting that prior case law
appears to treat interoperability as bearing on the copyrightability of software and labeling this
a “key, unresolved issue” stemming from the Oracle decision).
116. A thorough descriptive summary of the decision is available in Survey of Additional
IP and Technology Law Developments, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1317, 1351–55 (2015).
Predominantly critical evaluations of the appeals court’s analysis are available in: Pamela
Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for
Software Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1255-57 (2017) (criticizing
Oracle for, inter alia, misunderstanding Google’s argument against copyrightability of the Java
API as an argument against copyrightability of all software code and failing to defer to lower
court’s factual determinations); Jonathan Band, The Protectability of Application Program In-
terfaces: Oracle America v. Google, 59 J. OF THE JAPANESE GROUP OF THE INT’L ASS’N FOR
THE PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP. 2 (Oct. 2014). Candor requires me to acknowledge my
joining Professor Samuelson’s amicus brief in support of Google’s unsuccessful petition for a
writ of certiorari from the Federal Circuit’s decision. See Google Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (denying cert. to Oracle II, 750 F.3d 1339).
117. See Joel Rosenblatt, Google Beats Oracle $9 Billion Copyright Suit Over Use of
Java to Build Android, 92 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 2264, at 339 (June 3,
2016).
118. See Joe Mullin, It’s official: Oracle will appeal its “fair use” loss against Google,
ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 27, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/10/its-official-oracle-
will-appeal-its-fair-use-loss-against-google/, archived at [perma.cc/5LB8-HFAL].
119. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Oracle v. Google and Software’s Copyright Anticommons,
66 EMORY L.J. 265, 304 (2016), (arguing that impact of court’s decision will make collabora-
tive innovation and interoperability among heterogeneous software products more difficult by
giving one company control over the “technical vocabulary” necessary to develop compatible
products); JONATHAN BAND, INTERFACES ON TRIAL 3.0: ORACLE AMERICA V. GOOGLE AND
BEYOND 31-36 (2016) (arguing that Federal Circuit misread Ninth Circuit’s case law on inter-
operability, the First Circuit’s Lotus v. Borland decision, and the Federal Circuit’s own DMCA
precedents); Tyler J. Demasky, Recent Development, Oracle v. Google: Setting a Standard or
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not too early to conclude, however, that Oracle’s resuscitation of the Whelan
analysis—in which the scope of software copyrightability turns not upon
functional considerations or market needs served by the program but upon
whether a programmer could have used different software code to imple-
ment those same functional characteristics—will, if followed by other
courts, give software much more expansive copyright protection than the
still-dominant Altai analysis requires. Almost forty years after the CONTU
Report, the courts have made little progress in delimiting the precise scope
of copyright protection that applies to such functional “literary” works.
II. SOFTWARE PATENT LAW
A. Early Cases on Software Patenting
The governing U.S. Patent Act of 1952 emerged in a largely pre-
software world, and the possibility that patent protection might be extended
to computer software caused Congress none of the intellectual consternation
that would accompany the software copyright debate a generation later. Sec-
tion 101 of the patent statute provides, today as ever, that “[w]hoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”120
Those “conditions and requirements” demand that the invention be useful
(meaning, successfully accomplishing its intended purpose), novel (that is,
previously unknown), nonobvious (that is, not merely a trivial or inconse-
quential improvement over the prior art), and that it be adequately disclosed
in a valid application for a patent.121
A well-known trilogy of early Supreme Court cases under the 1952 Act
suggested that patent law presented substantial obstacles to the legal protec-
tion of computer software; indeed, the earliest of these cases led CONTU to
reject software patentability.122 In Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court ruled that
Handicapping an Industry?, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 1, 28–32 (2016) (arguing that
norms and settled practices of software industry validate the type of API reuse in which
Google engaged); Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling the Oracle
v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515, 1562 (2016) (arguing that Fed-
eral Circuit misinterpreted both § 102(b) and the Ninth Circuit precedents it purported to ap-
ply); Daria Vasilescu-Palermo, APIs and Copyright Protection: The Potential Impact on
Software Compatibility in the Programming Industry, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
153, 168 (2016) (“Holding that APIs are entitled to copyright protection may affect the inter-
operability of computer programs and hinder innovation in the field of computer program-
ming”); Lothar Determann & David Nimmer, Software Copyright’s Oracle from the Cloud, 30
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 170 (2015) (if future cases follow Oracle’s analysis, “defendants
will have to prove fair use, merger, or sce`nes a` faire in order to vindicate copying of interfaces,
lock-out codes, and other gateways to interoperability”).
120. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
121. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 111–112 (2012).
122. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
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a process for converting binary-coded decimal (“BCD”) numerals into a
“pure” binary form representing the same numerical value, despite its useful-
ness in digital computing, could not be patented, on the grounds that permit-
ting the patent would essentially monopolize the idea of numerical
conversion.123 In Parker v. Flook, the Court extended Benson to deny patent
protection to a new way of computing “alarm limits” that were constantly
updated during a catalytic conversion process, on the grounds that, despite
the inclusion of “post-solution activity” (the actual use of the result of the
computation in the control of the ongoing catalytic conversion process), the
claimed invention amounted to no more than a new mathematical formula,
the unpatentability of which was clear under existing law.124 In contrast, in
Diamond v. Diehr,125 the Court upheld a patent covering an improved rub-
ber-curing process that incorporated a computer-driven temperature control
mechanism. The Diehr Court distinguished Benson and Flook on the
grounds that the claimed invention involved more than the mere computa-
tion of a number and that the patent would not effectively prevent others
from using the same mathematical formula.126
Summarizing the impact of the Supreme Court’s Benson–Flook–Diehr
trilogy on patent eligibility, another court wrote:
The goal is to answer the question “What did applicants invent?” If
the claimed invention is a mathematical algorithm, it is improper
subject matter for patent protection, whereas if the claimed inven-
tion is an application of the algorithm, § 101 will not bar the grant
of a patent.127
123. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (“It is conceded that one may not
patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if the formula for converting
BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case. The mathematical formula
involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital com-
puter, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt
the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”).
124. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978). As in Benson, the Court feared that a
contrary ruling would essentially confer a patent monopoly over an abstract idea, noting that:
The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in
itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form
over substance. A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution
activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not
have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained
a final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to
existing surveying techniques.
125. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
126. See id. at 185–88.
127. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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This distinction, CONTU believed, implied “that it would be difficult for
any applicant to secure a patent in a program, since novel and useful mathe-
matical formulas may not be patented and since useful ‘post-solution appli-
cations’ of them meet the same fate.”128 Post-Diehr case law appeared to
substantiate this concern, as attempts to patent inventions incorporating
software components foundered on the lack of any identifiable physical ef-
fect or output.129
B. Alappat, State Street, and the Software Patent Boom
A series of Federal Circuit decisions in the mid-1990s, however, took a
very different view and greatly expanded the scope of patent protection for
software-related inventions. Just as the reach of software copyright began to
wane in the wake of decisions such as Altai, patent protection expanded to
fill the gap.
In In re Alappat,130 the court of appeals reversed the USPTO’s conclu-
sion that a computer-implemented invention was patent-ineligible subject
matter. The invention was a rasterizer that converted waveform data to pixel
values that could be displayed on a computer screen.131 Such rasterizers were
known in the prior art, and the claimed invention was implemented entirely
using “device[s] known in the electronics arts before Alappat made his in-
vention.”132 The claimed invention’s improvement over the prior art, in the
USPTO’s view, lay in its use of a novel “mathematical algorithm for com-
puting pixel information.”133 The USPTO reasoned that a mathematical
formula for computing pixel values was ineligible subject matter for patent-
ing under the reasoning of authorities such as Gottschalk v. Benson.134
In a fractured en banc ruling that produced seven separate opinions
(with three concurrences and three dissents), the Federal Circuit declared the
invention to be patent-eligible. The majority ruling reasoned that the inven-
tion amounted to the creation of a new and patent-eligible “machine,” within
the meaning of Section 101, “because a general purpose computer in effect
becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform par-
128. See generally CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
129. See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 293–94 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Grams, 888
F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The relative paucity of case law in this era is partly a reflection
of the fact that, for a variety of practical and philosophical considerations, many producers of
software did not even seek patent protection at all. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 66, at 449–50.
130. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated by In re Bilski,
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
131. Id. at 1538–39 (referencing pertinent claim language).
132. Id. at 1539 (emphasis omitted).
133. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 1539–40 (“[W]hen the claim is
viewed without the steps of this mathematical algorithm, no other elements or steps are
found.”) (internal quotations omitted.)
134. See generally id. at 1542 (discussing USPTO’s reasoning); cf. Gottschalk 409 U.S.
at 71–72.
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ticular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.”135 The
Benson rule against extending patentability to what was, in substance,
merely a mathematical algorithm presented no obstacle in the majority’s
view, for even though the invention “transform[ed] one set of data to another
through what may be viewed as a series of mathematical calculations,” the
patent language “is not ‘so abstract and sweeping’ that it would ‘wholly pre-
empt’ the use of any apparatus employing the combination of mathematical
calculations recited therein.”136 The rasterizer claimed in the patent was “not
a disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized as an ‘ab-
stract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and
tangible result.”137
Four years later, the court in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc.138extended Alappat still further, effectively declaring
that the “mathematical algorithm” exception to patentability could not be
invoked to limit patents for software. The invention in State Street was a
computerized system for mutual fund price accounting and administration.
The type of calculations at issue could be performed by hand, but the addi-
tion of a computer made it possible for share prices to be determined much
more rapidly after the close of each trading day.139 The use of a computer to
perform such calculations was not, in the court’s view, subject to the “math-
ematical algorithm” exception to patent-eligibility that doomed the patents in
Benson and Flook. Instead, citing Alappat, the court declared that:
[T]he transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts,
by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a
final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathemati-
cal algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces “a useful,
concrete and tangible result”—a final share price momentarily fixed
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied
upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.140
The combination of Alappat and State Street, along with a burgeoning
software sector in the U.S. economy in the 1990s, produced a sizable in-
crease in the number of patents covering software inventions issued by the
USPTO. The number of issued patents within the computing field grew from
fewer than 5,000 in 1995, to nearly 12,000 in 1998, to over 16,000 in 2004,
135. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545.
136. Id. at 1544 (quoting Benson).
137. Id.
138. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
139. See id. at 1371.
140. Id. at 1373.
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25,000 in 2009, and nearly 55,000 in 2014.141 The Federal Circuit’s reason-
ing that software was patent-eligible because it produced a “useful, concrete,
and tangible result” met with criticism in the United States,142 and many
foreign jurisdictions continued to insist that, as a mere exercise in applied
mathematics, software standing alone was ineligible for patent protection.143
In the United States, however, patent-law issues began to loom very large
for participants in the software industry, with even established and reputable
developers cited for infringement of comparatively obscure inventions.144
C. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011
As Congress began debating significant patent reform legislation in the
middle of the first decade of the 2000s, the massive growth in software pat-
enting occasionally became a subject of legislative concern. Patents covering
business methods enabled by use of a computer, the sort of invention at issue
in the State Street case, came in for particular scrutiny. Representative Jo-
seph Crowley (D-NY) complained about “nuisance patents” that allowed a
patentee to “sue the Red Cross for soliciting charitable contributions on the
Internet, claiming that his patent covers this entire field.”145 Senator Charles
Schumer (D-NY) criticized a patent over “double clicking” on a computer.146
Academics, technologists, and popular commentators, too, questioned
whether the incentive of patent protection was appropriate or necessary for
software development.147 Part of the problem, some suggested, was that
141. See Patent Counts By Class By Year, CY 1977–2015, http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm (accessed Apr. 7, 2016) [hereafter USPTO PATENT COUNTS].
The referenced totals include all patents issued in Classes 700 through 726.
142. See, e.g., Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
136–37 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (State Street “does say that
a process is patentable if it produces a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result.’ But this Court has
never made such a statement and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances where
this Court has held the contrary.”) (citing, inter alia, Benson and Flook).
143. For example, legislation to ban the issuance of patents over software was proposed
in 2013 in Germany and New Zealand. See Joe Mullin, In historic vote, New Zealand bans
software patents, ARS TECHNICA, (Aug. 28, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/
in-historic-vote-new-zealand-bans-software-patents/; AA Thornton & Co., German Proposal
to Limit Software Patenting, (July 8, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
201b37de-d4f2-4b23-88a2-ddf53e5e3ab9.
144. See, e.g., i4i LP v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Defendant’s
flagship Microsoft Word product infringed plaintiff’s patent on editing XML document
markup language), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
145. 157 CONG. REC. H4496 (daily ed. June 23, 2011).
146. 157 CONG. REC. S5436–37 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011). The apparent reference was to
U.S. Patent No. 6,727,830, issued April 27, 2004 to Microsoft Corporation.
147. See, e.g., RICHARD M. STALLMAN, THE DANGER OF SOFTWARE PATENTS, IN FREE
SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 95 (Joshua Gay, ed.,
2002); JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 132–35 (1996); Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live?: The
Case Against Software and Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 853–71
(2003).
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software had been deemed to be unpatentable subject matter for so long that
there was essentially no public record of the prior art against which the
USPTO could evaluate any individual patent application, resulting in the
issuance of an excessive number of substantively weak patents.148
With sustained Congressional attention returning to the subject of intel-
lectual property for the first time in many years, the time might have ap-
peared ripe for the legislature to revisit the CONTU Report’s assumptions
about the proper form of intellectual property protection for computer
software. The opportunity, however, passed largely unnoticed. The final ver-
sion of the resulting patent reform legislation, enacted as the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”),149 included several provisions that
dealt obliquely with software patenting, but none addressing the issue di-
rectly. The bill expanded the prior commercial use defense, which had origi-
nally been enacted to protect accused infringers of business-method patents,
to cover other types of patents, including software.150 A new limitation on
the patenting of tax strategies was expressly declared in the bill not to invali-
date patents on tax preparation software.151 The legislation included a new
transitional procedure for reviewing business method patents,152 but several
legislators stated that the new review process would apply only to patents
claiming business methods as such, not software patents.153 Confusingly, de-
spite Congress’s apparent belief that the post-grant review procedure would
not apply to patents claiming software as such, the Obama Administration
cited the new review process as a reason for rejecting an online citizen peti-
148. See ADAM B. JAFFEE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 200–02
(2004); BOYLE, supra note 147, at 134 (“Partly because the Patent Office has no expertise in
software matters, it is widely thought to grant too many patents and to cover processes that had
previously been considered to be part of the public domain.”).
149. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) [hereafter AIA].
150. AIA, supra note 149, § 5, 125 Stat. at 297–99 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 273); see also
157 CONG. REC. S5430 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (explaining the intent
of the new provision).
151. AIA, supra note 149, § 14(c), 125 Stat. at 327–28 (codified at note following 35
U.S.C. § 102); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, Part 1, at 51–52, 79 (“a software program that
is novel and non-obvious as software would not be affected by this section even though the
software is used for a tax purpose”); reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 82, 104; 157 CONG.
REC. S5432 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“patents can still be issued for software that helps taxpay-
ers prepare their tax returns, but that provision is intended to be narrowly construed and is not
intended to authorize patents for business methods or financial management software”); En-
fish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“This section [of
the AIA] implicitly affirms software as [patent-]eligible subject matter.”).
152. AIA, supra note 149, § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31 (codified at note following 35
U.S.C. § 321).
153. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S5431 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(“technological inventions are excluded from the scope of the program. . .. an actual software
invention is a technological invention, and is not subject to review under section 18”); id. at
S5433 (statement of Sen. Durbin); id. at S5441 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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tion calling for an end to software patenting.154 The result of all the legisla-
tive attention paid to software patenting in the run-up to the AIA was,
ultimately, very little substantive change in the law.
D. Bilski and Alice: The Boom Goes Bust
The substantial changes to judicial doctrine on the subject of software
patenting in this decade present a substantial contrast to the relative inaction
of Congress. The Supreme Court has addressed the patent eligibility of
software-related inventions in two cases since 2010, with consequences that
are still being felt in the lower courts.
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in In re Bilski undertook a
searching review of the evolution of the law on the patent-eligibility of
software inventions.155 Bilski involved a patent covering the use of hedging
techniques in commodities trading, not computer software.156 Nevertheless,
the court’s analysis did much to undermine the key precedents upon which
software had been determined to be broadly patent-eligible. The court of
appeals drew from the Supreme Court’s Benson–Flook–Diehr trilogy the
principle that “[a] claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if:
(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a par-
ticular article into a different state or thing.”157 The court then confronted its
own post-Diehr case law. Specifically disapproving the reasoning of Alappat
and State Street, the court of appeals stated:
[W]hile looking for “a useful, concrete and tangible result” may in
many instances provide useful indications of whether a claim is
drawn to a fundamental principle or a practical application of such a
principle, that inquiry is insufficient to determine whether a claim is
patent-eligible under § 101. . .. Therefore, we also conclude that the
“useful, concrete and tangible result” inquiry is inadequate and reaf-
firm that the machine-or-transformation test outlined by the Su-
preme Court is the proper test to apply.158
154. See Quentin Palfrey, Promoting Innovation and Competitive Markets through Qual-
ity Patents, PETITION THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE ISSUES THAT MATTER TO YOU, (Sept. 23,
2011), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/direct-patent-office-cease-issuing-software-
patents (“the new transitional post-grant review program will help the USPTO take a closer
look at certain business method patents, including a number of software patents”), archived at
[perma.cc/TJ4N-5DLV].
155. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593 (2010).
156. See Bilski at 949 (quoting patent claim language).
157. Id. at 954; see also id. at 951–55 (surveying development of Supreme Court’s views
on patent eligibility).
158. Id. at 959–60 (emphasis added); cf. supra notes 137, 140 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court affirmed.159 Although the majority agreed that Bil-
ski’s invention was unpatentable, it ruled that the Federal Circuit’s exclusive
focus on whether the claimed process was “tied to a particular machine or
apparatus” or “transforms a particular article” was too narrow.160 Neverthe-
less, the majority agreed with the Federal Circuit in rejecting the suggestion
of cases such as State Street that a “useful, concrete and tangible result”
sufficed to render a computational process patent-eligible.161
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and three others, would have gone
further still. Both English and American legal history, in the concurring
opinion’s view, supported a conclusion that “a series of steps for conducting
business is not a ‘process’ under § 101.”162 Congress’s creation of the “prior
commercial use” defense in 1999, Justice Stevens argued, reflected its “sur-
prise and perhaps even dismay” at the Federal Circuit’s decision in State
Street.163 And Justice Breyer wrote separately to “highlight the substantial
agreement among many Members of the Court” on several issues, including
specifically the Court’s unanimous rejection of the “useful, concrete, and
tangible result” test from State Street.164
The potential implications of Bilski for software patenting became clear
four years later with the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank International.165 Alice involved “several patents that disclose
schemes to manage certain forms of financial risk” that were “[a]ll. . . imple-
mented using a computer; the system and media claims expressly recite a
computer, and the parties have stipulated that the method claims require a
computer as well.”166 Agreeing with the court of appeals that the patent’s
claims were directed to ineligible subject matter, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that its case law required the courts to “distinguish between patents
that claim the building blocks of human ingenuity and those that integrate
the building blocks into something more, thereby transforming them into a
patent-eligible invention[.]”167 Its precedents in Benson and Flook, the Court
159. 561 U.S. 593.
160. See id. at 603 (“Adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for
what constitutes a ‘process’ (as opposed to just an important and useful clue) violates these
statutory interpretation principles.”), 604 (“The machine-or- transformation test is not the sole
test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”).
161. Id. at 612 (“nothing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of
§ 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past. See, e.g., State
Street, 149 F.3d, at 1373. . ..”); cf. supra note 140 and accompanying text.
162. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 643 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 626–44.
163. See id. at 645. As noted previously, Congress enlarged this exception in the 2011
AIA to remove any suggestion that it was limited to patents over business methods. See supra
note 150 and accompanying text.
164. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 657, 659–60 (Breyer, J., concurring).
165. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
166. Id. at 2352 (footnote omitted), 2353.
167. Id. at 1254 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Pro-
metheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012)).
164 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 24:131
continued, set forth “the longstanding rule that an idea of itself is not patent-
able.”168 And Bilski established that “basic concept[s]” and “fundamental ec-
onomic practice[s]” constituted just such “a patent-ineligible abstract idea,
just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.”169 In Alice, the Court
identified another unpatentable “abstract idea” underlying the claims made
in the challenged patent: “the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the
use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”170
Unlike the business method at issue in Bilski, the patent claims in Alice
all required the use of specialized computer software. Reviewing its Ben-
son–Flook–Diehr trilogy, however, the Court in Alice reasoned that “[t]he
introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis[.]”171
To the contrary, the Court continued, “if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to implement an abstract idea on a computer,
that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.”172 “[E]ach step” of the
software-implemented process claimed in the patent “does no more than re-
quire a generic computer to perform generic computer functions.”173 This
differed, in the Court’s view, from other types of computer-related inven-
tions that might meet the threshold requirement of patent eligibility:
Viewed as a whole, petitioner’s method claims simply recite the
concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic com-
puter. The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve
the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an im-
provement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the
claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than an in-
struction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using
some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is
not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.174
In the wake of the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Alappat and State
Street, the USPTO began to grant many more patents covering software in-
ventions.175 Following Alice, however, the reverse appears to be occurring.
In 2015, the first full year following Alice for which data are available, the
number of U.S. software patents issued fell by 7.12%—the first year-over-
168. Id. at 2355 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
169. Id. at 2356 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2357; see also id. at 2357–58.
172. Id. at 2358 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
173. Id. at 2359.
174. Id. at 2359–60 (internal quotations and citations omitted, emphasis added). Justice
Sotomayor, joined by two others, would have decided the case based upon the general un-
patentability of claims for methods of transacting business without addressing the computer
software issue. See id. at 2360–61 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
175. See USPTO PATENT COUNTS, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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year decline in the number of such patents granted since 2007.176 In one
subject-matter field (category 705, Data Processing: Financial, Business
Practice, Management, or Cost/Price Determination), the number of issued
patents fell by more than half in a single year.177 A recent study found that
Alice had also led to the first decline in five years in the number of new
patent infringement lawsuits filed, with a 13% decrease in 2014.178
Lower courts, too, have been reacting to the Court’s ruling in Alice.
Although some computer-related patents withstood judicial scrutiny after Al-
ice,179 a vastly greater number were struck down as patent-ineligible subject
matter.180 With manifest understatement, the Federal Circuit noted recently
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015 Patent Litigation Study: A Change in Patentee
Fortunes 3 & fig. 1, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2015-
pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf, archived at [perma.cc/K2LM-EXRM]. New case filings re-
bounded somewhat in 2015, although did they not return to pre-Alice levels; and case filings in
2016 fell again, to the lowest level since 2011. See Brian Howard, Announcing the Patent
Litigation Year in Review 2015, https://lexmachina.com/14318/ (Mar. 16, 2016), archived at
[perma.cc/4L87-CW5M]; Brian Howard, 2016 Fourth Quarter Litigation Update, https://
lexmachina.com/q4-litigation-update/ (Jan. 12, 2017), archived at [perma.cc/4FJC-CM2E].
179. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, LP, 773 F.3d 1245, 1256–59 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); Motio, Inc. v. BSP Software LLC, 154 F. Supp. 3d 434, 437–41 (E.D. Tex. 2016);
California Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Comm’cns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 993–1000 (C.D. Cal.
2014); Fairfield Indus., Inc. v. Wireless Seismic, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-2972, 2014 WL 7342525,
**5–7 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014).
180. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 792 F.3d
1363, 1367–71 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1362–64 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d
709, 713–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Planet Bingo, LLC v. VGKS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014); OpenTV, Inc. v.
Apple Inc., No. 5:15-cv-02008-EJD, 2016 WL 344845, **4–9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016);
American Needle, Inc. v. Cafe´ Press Inc., No. 15-cv-3968, 2016 WL 232438, **2–3 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 19, 2016); Motivation Innovations, LLC v. Petsmart, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 558, 568–69
(D. Del. 2016); Open Text S.A. v. Box, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1046–50 (N.D. Cal. 2015);
Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 78 F. Supp. 3d 884, 888–94
(N.D. Ill. 2015); Bascom Research, LLC v. LinkedIn, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 940, 947–54 (N.D.
Cal. 2015); Collarity, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 11-1103-MPT, 2015 WL 7597413, **4–11 (D.
Del. Nov. 25, 2015); Listingbook, LLC v. Market Leader, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-583, 144 F. Supp.
3d 777, 786–92 (M.D.N.C. 2015); Telebuyer, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. No. 2:13-cv-
1677-BJR, 2015 WL 4493045, **9–12 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2015); Jericho Sys. Corp. v.
Axiomatics, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-2281-K, 2015 WL 2165931, **3–7 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2015);
Advanced Auctions LLC v. eBay Inc., No. 13CV1612 BEN (JLB), 2015 WL 1415265, **3–6
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015); Tenon & Groove, LLC v. Plusgrade S.E.C., No. 12-1118-GMS-
SRF, 2015 WL 82531, **7–8 (D. Del. Jan. 6, 2015), magistrate’s recommendations adopted,
2015 WL 1133213 (D. Del. Mar. 11, 2015); Hewlett Packard Co. v. ServiceNow, Inc., No. 14-
cv-00570-BLF, 2015 WL 1133244, **5–11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015); IpLearn, LLC v. K12
Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 525, 531–35 (D. Del. 2014); KomBea Corp. v. Noguar L.C., 73 F. Supp.
3d 1348, 1351–57 (D. Utah 2014); Cogent Medicine, Inc. v. Elsevier Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d
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that Alice gave “renewed vigor” to “§ 101 defense[s] previously lacking in
merit” under prior law.181
In mid-2016, with software patents in free fall, the Federal Circuit sig-
naled a desire to limit some of the impact of the Alice analysis. Judge
Hughes’s opinion for the panel in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp.182cautioned that “[w]e do not read Alice to broadly hold that all im-
provements in computer-related technology are inherently abstract[.]”183 Al-
though the Supreme Court had suggested that inventions that “purport to
improve the functioning of the computer itself” would be more likely patent-
eligible, the Enfish court countered that “[s]oftware can make non-abstract
improvements to computer technology just as hardware improvements
can[.]”184 Just five days later, however, in another opinion by Judge Hughes,
the Court of Appeals struck down another software patent that merely
claimed the use of “conventional or generic technology in a nascent but
well-known environment.”185 The division between these two virtually si-
multaneous panel opinions concerning what the Alice analysis actually re-
quires has continued to color subsequent cases, with multiple decisions both
upholding186 and invalidating187 particular software patents.
1058, 1063–66 (N.D. Cal. 2014); MyMedicalRecords, Inc. v. Walgreen Co., Nos. 2:13-CV-
00631 ODW (SHx) et al., 2014 WL 7339201, **2–5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2014); Open Text
S.A. v. Alfresco Software Ltd., No. 13-cv-04843-JD, 2014 WL 4684429 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19,
2014); Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 8:11-cv-2826-T-23TBM,
2014 WL 4540319 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2014).
181. Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); see also Jasper L. Tran, Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. SOC’Y 354 (2016) (summarizing post-Alice patent invalidation rates of the Federal
Circuit, district courts, and the USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board).
182. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp, 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
183. Id. at 1335.
184. Id.; cf. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2347 and accompanying text.
185. In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
186. See, e.g., Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1257–62 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (upholding patents over system for billing of network users based on bandwidth they
consumed where system “entails an unconventional technological solution. . . to a technologi-
cal problem” and “operate[s] in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in com-
puter functionality”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (upholding patent on method of synchronizing lip and facial movements of
video-game characters where claimed invention was “limited to a specific [animation] pro-
cess. . . and does not preempt approaches that use rules of a different structure or different
techniques”); BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (upholding patent that “recite[d] a specific, discrete implementation of
the abstract idea of filtering content”); TNS Media Research LLC v. TIVO Research and
Analytics, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 168, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (specifically noting post-Enfish
trend toward slightly broader acceptance of software patent validity).
187. See, e.g., Easyweb Innovations. LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 689 F. App’x 969 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (invalidating five patents); Recognicorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322,
1326–28 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1340–42 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d
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The Alice decision itself has come in for some criticism, with one court
comparing Alice’s methodology to Justice Stewart’s famous “I know it when
I see it” standard for identifying obscenity.188 And another criticized Alice
for “fail[ing] to answer this: when, if ever, do computer patents survive
§ 101?”189 Many open issues remain, such as how to identify an “abstract
idea” ineligible for patent protection, or an “inventive concept” that may
rescue the “abstract idea” and render it patent-eligible.190 Although its ulti-
mate importance may not yet be known, Alice has already had a demonstra-
ble impact on both administrative and judicial practice in software patenting.
1315, 1327–32 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (invalidating two patents); Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 680
F. App’x 977 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (invalidating three patents); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys.,
Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (invalidating patent on method for detecting misuse
of confidential health data where patent’s “claims merely implement an old practice in a new
environment”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F3d 1307, 1314–16 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (invalidating e-mail filtering patent that added no inventive concept to the abstract
idea of searching digital information to see whether it contained specified content); Affinity
Labs of Tex., LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (invalidating
patent that merely “recites the use of generic features of cellular telephones” to implement “the
general concept of out-of-region delivery of broadcast content”); LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow,
Inc., 656 F. App’x 991, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (invalidating patent that merely claimed imple-
mentation of a “fundamental economic practice” performed electronically); Front Row Techs.,
LLC v. NBA Media Ventures, LLC, 204 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1268, 1279 (D.N.M. 2016) (invali-
dating patent claims “directed to two abstract ideas: (i) sending video of an event to handheld
devices over wireless networks; and (ii) authorizing handheld devices to receive streaming
video based on a user’s location” where electronic devices that were alleged to supply the
necessary “inventive concept” “are generic, and the claims use them in conventional ways”);
Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 655, 661–64 (D. Del. 2016)
(invalidating patent directed to implementing abstract idea of “targeted advertising” using “ge-
neric computer components”).
188. Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equipment Corp., No. SACV 14-154-GW(AJWx),
2014 WL 4407592, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring)); See also id. (“Thus, so far, the two-part [Alice] test for
identifying an abstract idea appears to be of limited utility, while comparisons to previously
adjudicated patents—or more precisely, to past cases’ characterizations of those patents—have
done the heavy lifting.”) (citation and footnote omitted); Amdocs, supra 186, at 817–18 (ex-
pressing similar views).
189. California Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Comm’cns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 984 (C.D.
Cal. 2014).
190. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (recognizing the “problem inherent in the search for a definition of an ‘abstract
idea’ that is not itself abstract”); John Clizer, Note, Exploring the Abstract: Patent Eligibility
Post Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 80 MO. L. REV. 537, 552–56 (2015). The Federal Circuit has
disavowed any attempt to supply a governing definition. See Amdocs, supra 186, at 1294
(declaring it “difficult to fashion a workable definition [of ‘abstract idea’] to be applied to as-
yet-unknown cases with as-yet-unknown inventions”). The court instead invites litigants to
reason by analogy to earlier cases in which the patent-eligibility of similar inventions was
resolved. See id.
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III. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
Both copyright and patent law have changed significantly in the last two
decades, and are continuing to evolve in ways that may be highly conse-
quential for the development and legal protection of computer software. The
case developments sketched out above describe two opposing pendulum sw-
ings: in copyright, from relatively strong protection under early decisions
such as Whelan, to relatively weak protection under Altai, to the apparent
revival of the Whelan analysis under Oracle; and in patent, from relatively
strong protection under Alappat and State Street, to the more recent deci-
sions in Bilski and (especially) Alice, which appear to be causing a substan-
tial pullback in the extent of patent protection for software.
All this has happened, however, with virtually no legislative action. In-
deed, turmoil in the pertinent legal doctrines reflects nothing so much as the
lack of meaningful guidance in the language of the governing statutes. Time
and again, Congress has spoken either indirectly or not at all on the issues
that have divided the courts.191 Ameliorating the problems caused by legisla-
tive inaction would seem to represent a problem particularly suited to legis-
lative response. Congress and the courts, however, both have multiple
sources of authority from which they might draw to help clarify the reach of
intellectual property protection for software. A sufficiently rigorous judicial
reexamination of the copyright and patent law principles that recent prece-
dents have so thoroughly unsettled might even obviate the need for remedial
legislation; and if legislation is ultimately necessary, Congress has several
paths from which to choose. It is appropriate, accordingly, to survey some of
the possible institutional responses to the problems described above.
A. Statutory Revision or Administrative Delegation
Perhaps the most direct alternative would be for Congress to simply
answer the questions raised by recent case law concerning the availability
and scope of patent and copyright protection for software. At present, how-
ever, there is little evidence that Congress possesses the expertise necessary
to legislate wisely in this area. Congress counts few technological experts
among its members.192 Nor has Congress undertaken notable steps to de-
velop policy expertise in this area. Of the twenty hearings on copyright re-
form that the House Judiciary Committee held between 2013 and 2015, for
191. See, e.g., supra notes 62–64 (noting that Congress expressed its desire to extend
copyright protection to software only in the legislative history, not the text, of the 1980 amend-
ments to the Copyright Act), 149–154 (noting that the 2011 AIA statute only obliquely consid-
ered the possibility of patenting software) and accompanying text.
192. See Congressional Research Service, Membership of the 114th Congress: A Profile,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43869.pdf, at 4 (2016) (noting that the present Congress includes
“five software company executives in the House and two in the Senate” as well as “one physi-
cist, one microbiologist, one chemist, and eight engineers (all in the House, with the exception
of one Senator who is an engineer)”).
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example, not one devoted itself to the question of software copyright.193 The
very paucity of legislation dealing specifically with either copyright or pat-
ent protection for software shows that Congress itself may possess limited
institutional competence to legislate on the question without external
guidance.194
As an alternative to legislating directly, Congress might choose—as it
frequently has in other areas involving complex technical subject matter—to
delegate power to an outside agency to devise and administer appropriate
legal rules.195 Indeed, there is some precedent for such a delegation within
the copyright statute itself; in 1998, Congress delegated to the Librarian of
Congress the authority to create exceptions to liability under the new anticir-
cumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.196 A promi-
nent rationale for delegating substantive rulemaking authority to
administrative agencies—to wit, that specialist agencies’ technical expertise
will lead to rules better adapted to the specific characteristics of the activities
they regulate—would appear to be fully applicable in the complex field of
computer technology.197 Proposals to increase the involvement of specialized
administrative bodies in intellectual property law recur periodically in the
academic literature.198
193. See U.S. Copyright Review, supra note 15.
194. Congress’s historical practice of outsourcing the drafting of intellectual property
legislation to affected industry groups only reinforces doubts about whether statutory revision
is a task Congress is equipped to undertake on its own—while also clouding the question
whether legislation resulting from such a process would necessarily advance the broader public
interest. See Sepehr Shahshahani, The Nirvana Fallacy in Fair Use Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 273, 291–95 (2015); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy:
A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 42 (2008) (“A major problem for
legislative battles involving innovation is that future industries and innovators do not have a
seat at the lobbying table, as they either do not exist or exist only in nascent form.”). My
emphasis herein on the question of legislative competence is not meant to signal unconcern
with the effect of statutory revision on the public interest; indeed, the proposal articulated
below for a legislative commission modeled on the original CONTU would provide the oppor-
tunity for public-interest advocates to have more direct influence on legislative outcomes than
they presently enjoy.
195. See, e.g., Anandashankar Mazumdar, Disagreement on Autonomy, Small Claims But
Largely Agree on IT Improvement, 93 PAT. COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK J. (BNA) 3009, 3010
(2017) (summarizing proposal by publishers’ trade association to give Copyright Office sub-
stantive rulemaking authority on grounds that agency may react more swiftly than Congress to
technological change).
196. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(E) (2012).
197. See, e.g., Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865–66 (1984) (reasoning that agencies’ superior substantive expertise justifies judicial defer-
ence to their construction of complex regulatory terms); Benjamin & Rai, supra, note 194, at
33–34 (summarizing factors tending to give administrative agencies greater substantive exper-
tise in technical fields than Congress or the courts are able to develop).
198. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395,
413 (2009) (arguing that administrative agencies play a “surprising[ly]” “limited” role in intel-
lectual property law, which “is well-suited to agency governance”); Michael W. Carroll, Fix-
ing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1123–27 (2007) (arguing for creation of administrative
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There are reasons to doubt the viability of the administrative alternative
here, however. First, and perhaps most obviously, the existence of multiple
proposals to expand the authority of administrative agencies in intellectual
property serves to highlight the novelty of this approach. Administrative
governance remains largely untried in regulating intellectual property,199 and
Congress may be less inclined to depart from past practice here than if it
were contemplating regulation of a previously unregulated field. Second,
Congress’s duty to confine agencies’ delegated powers within “intelligible
principles” fixed by the legislature200 means that even the choice of adminis-
trative regulation cannot entirely free Congress from the duty to grapple with
some of the challenging questions surrounding intellectual property protec-
tion for software that have arisen in the absence of legislative guidance to
date.
Recent history provides a third reason to question the efficacy of the
administrative alternative.201 In 2006 and 2010, the Librarian of Congress
used the authority delegated to it under the 1998 DMCA statute to promul-
gate a DMCA exemption permitting purchasers of handheld wireless devices
(such as cellular telephones) to “unlock” the devices so they could be used
on other providers’ networks.202 In 2012, however, the Librarian effectively
refused to renew the exemption, based largely upon arguments it had consid-
ered and persuasively rejected in the earlier rulemakings.203 Consumers frus-
trated by the agency’s abrupt and poorly explained volte-face complained to
the Obama Administration, which agreed that “consumers should be able to
unlock their cell phones without risking criminal or other penalties.”204 Con-
tribunal within U.S. Copyright Office to adjudicate issues of fair use); Joseph P. Liu, Regula-
tory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 148–60 (2004) (recommending legislative delegation of
both rulemaking and adjudicative functions to the Copyright Office or another administrative
agency); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Sys-
tems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 66–67 (2001) (suggesting that Library of Congress serve as
escrow agent to hold decryption keys that users would need to engage in fair uses of encrypted
digital works). For a less sanguine view, see Benjamin & Rai, supra note 194, at 47–51 (criti-
cizing agencies as protecting market incumbents at the expense of innovation).
199. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting that the USPTO has no substantive rulemaking power in patent law).
200. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
201. A further retelling of these events is available in Timothy K. Armstrong, The DMCA
and the Cell Phone Unlocking Debate (Cincinnati Law Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 14-04), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2401013.
202. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825-01, 43,830–31 (July 27, 2010); Exemp-
tion to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,476 (Nov. 27, 2006).
203. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,260, 65,264–66 (Oct. 26, 2012).
204. Make Unlocking Cell Phones Legal, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 24, 2013), https://
petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/make-unlocking-cell-phones-legal/1g9KhZG7 [http://web
.archive.org/web/20150128211840/https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/make-unlocking-
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gress agreed and amended the DMCA to make the cell phone unlocking
exemption permanent.205 The result of the delegation of rulemaking author-
ity, in this instance at least, was that the agency bungled an issue involving
advanced technologies so badly that Congress had to step in anyway to fix
the problem. To be sure, this example hardly demonstrates that administra-
tive regulation of technology is doomed to failure. It does, however, provide
a cautionary illustration for those skeptical that administrative expertise will
necessarily yield results best attuned to the needs of technology users.
B. Bringing Outside Expertise to Bear
If Congress itself lacks the expertise either to legislate directly or to
supply intelligible standards to guide administrative policymaking, then the
solution must at some point involve looking outside Congress for guidance.
Several models for developing such policy guidance exist. For example, in
areas ordinarily governed by state law, the Uniform Law Commission sup-
plies model legislation intended to have general applicability, such as the
ubiquitous Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the generally successful Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), and the largely rejected Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA).206 Alternatively, the series of Re-
statements of the Law published by the American Law Institute (ALI) pro-
vide guidance and commentary on widely accepted principles of both state
and federal law; indeed, the drafting of the ALI’s first-ever Restatement of
Copyright Law is underway at the time of this writing.207
Neither of these alternatives quite fits the current need to clarify both
copyright and patent law as they apply to computer software, however. Cop-
yright and patent law are overwhelmingly governed by federal, not state,
law, and are for that reason ill-suited to the model-act drafting process.208
cell-phones-legal/1g9KhZG7]. A somewhat chastened Librarian of Congress responded by de-
claring that “[t]he rulemaking is a technical, legal proceeding” that “was not intended to be a
substitute for deliberations of broader public policy.” Press Release, LIBRARY OF CONG., State-
ment from the Library of Congress Regarding White House Statement Today in Response to a
Petition on Section 1201 Rulemaking (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2013/13-
041.html [perma.cc/7TS4-F6JN].
205. See Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 113-
144, 128 Stat. 1751 (2014).
206. See generally, Acts, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Acts.aspx
(last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
207. See Copyright, AM. LAW INSTI., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/copyright/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2017). For a generally favorable view of the possible benefit of a Restatement
in the field of copyright law, see Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as More
Independent and Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 457 (2014). For a more skeptical reac-
tion, see Michael Risch, Weighing Treatises v. Restatements—Copyright Edition, WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION (Jan. 27, 2015), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/01/weighing-trea
tises-v-restatements.html [perma.cc/K577-W6TR].
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (federal law now preempts “all legal or equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copy-
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ALI Restatements, meanwhile, “aim at clear formulations. . . and reflect the
law as it presently stands or might appropriately be stated by a court.”209 One
may question whether a “clear formulation” of the law of software copyright
“as it presently stands” is even possible in view of the fluid nature of current
doctrine.210 And, of course, the ALI has yet to take up the subject of patent
law, rendering any guidance it might provide on software copyright law nec-
essarily incomplete.
International bodies such as WIPO or the WTO might provide alterna-
tive fora for debating and resolving software issues. This alternative, how-
ever, presents difficulties of its own. International views are, if anything,
even less settled than United States law on the desirability and nature of
intellectual property protection for software.211 Congress and the present Ad-
ministration may balk at even the appearance of following international enti-
ties’ leadership. And, of course, the history of U.S. reliance on international
fora to resolve contentious intellectual property issues is somewhat check-
ered; the story of how the 1996 WIPO process was used effectively to short-
circuit Congressional opposition to the legislation that became the 1998
DMCA remains salient today.212
On over 100 occasions in the last thirty years, Congress has created
temporary advisory commissions tasked with developing policy expertise in
a wide variety of subject areas and reporting back to the legislature.213 Such
commissions are well-understood and accepted parts of the legislative pro-
right. . .. under the common law or statutes of any State”); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (confer-
ring exclusive federal court jurisdiction over cases “arising under any Act of Congress relating
to patents. . . or copyrights”). Small pockets of state regulatory authority remain; for example,
state (rather than federal) law governs the existence and scope of copyright rights in sound
recordings fixed in a tangible medium before February 15, 1972. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c)
(2012); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 821 F.3d 265, 269–71 (2d Cir. 2016)
(certifying question of state copyright law); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 70
N.E.3d 936 (N.Y. 2016) (answering certified question). In Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059
(2013), the Supreme Court approved state-court jurisdiction over legal malpractice claims aris-
ing from allegedly mishandled patent litigation—a result that, if applied broadly, may permit
state courts to adjudicate other ancillary questions connected with patent cases.
209. Publication Frequently Asked Questions, AM. LAW. INST., https://www.ali.org/publi
cations/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter ALI FAQ].
210. For a recognition of this general difficulty that nevertheless concludes that the ALI
is capable of resolving such challenges, see Lance Liebman, Law Reform Agenda as ALI Ap-
proaches Its Centennial, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 821, 822–23 (2014). The ALI also offers alterna-
tive publications styled Principles of the Law that it believes more suitable than a Restatement
“when an area is so new that there is little established law.” ALI FAQ, supra note 209. This
alternative may be better suited to software copyright law in its present state.
211. See, e.g., supra note 143 and infra note 233 and accompanying text.
212. See generally BLAYNE HAGGART, COPYFIGHT: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT REFORM 109–32 (2014); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 122–45 (2001).
213. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40076, CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSIONS: OVERVIEW,
STRUCTURE, AND LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2017) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL COM-
MISSIONS. Policy commissions made up “the vast majority” of the 107 congressional commis-
sions established from 1989 to 2016. See id. at 4, 5.
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cess and are subject to statutory obligations requiring, among other things,
balance of competing viewpoints and the holding of public meetings.214 Leg-
islative reliance on the diverse viewpoints of outside experts can improve
consensus-based policymaking and reduce the impact of partisan polariza-
tion.215 The original CONTU Commission was one such body, of course.
One need not accept the conclusions of the original CONTU report in every
particular to celebrate the principle that policymaking should be informed by
substantive expertise.216
Accordingly, Congress should consider the formation of a new legisla-
tive commission—staffed, as the original CONTU was not, with technolo-
gists and software experts, not only attorneys—to provide policy
guidance.217 A new CONTU could consider the issues from a broader per-
spective than any court, because courts ordinarily must accept the litigants’
framing of the issues for review. The requirement of viewpoint diversity
might better ensure that the public interest is taken into account in the com-
mission’s deliberations than in a legislative process from which the public is
generally excluded.218 And a legislative commission could reassess
CONTU’s perceptions of the interplay between copyright, patent, trade se-
crecy, and other possible forms of intellectual property protection for
software in light of more recent trends in the law and the software
industry.219
IV. AN AGENDA FOR A NEW CONTU
A new CONTU commission should address, at a minimum, the follow-
ing issues:
214. See 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 5(b), 10 (2012); see also COLTON C. CAMPBELL, DISCHARG-
ING CONGRESS: GOVERNMENT BY COMMISSION 3 (2002) (explaining these and other provisions
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act that aim to “maximize the public and broadly repre-
sentative nature of the panels”).
215. See CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSIONS, supra note 213, at 6–8. Of course, such com-
missions are made up of fallible mortals who may be ignorant or wasteful, and who are in any
event not directly accountable to the voters for their conduct (although Congress, of course,
remains accountable for any actions it takes or fails to take based on an expert body’s recom-
mendation). Id. at 9–10.
216. See Liu, supra note 198, at 161 (citing CONTU as “at least one successful example
of [the] approach” of “an impartial expert body or commission” convened to advise Congress
in areas where it lacks substantive expertise).
217. See Samuelson, supra note 29, at 699 (noting that CONTU included “no computer
scientists, no software or hardware industry representatives, nor any users of complex software
systems”).
218. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g. Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 551, 553–56 (arguing that the 1976 Act and post-CONTU legislation were
drafted before software was well understood by policymakers, and that improvement in our
understanding over intervening decades now presents an opportune moment to revise the
statute).
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A. The Existence and Shape of Legal Protection
1. Incentives and Copying
Naturally, parties who derive financial gains from the incumbent legal
regime may be expected to argue that their benefits should be continued or
even enlarged.220 Congress should not, however, close its eyes to evidence
that legal protection may be unnecessary in at least some situations to pro-
mote the development of computer software. CONTU itself viewed the issue
as at least open to debate, and subsequent events suggest that Congress may
be wise to revisit the question.221
Two post-CONTU developments illustrate why rethinking the extension
of intellectual property protections to software works may be appropriate.
First, one assumption underlying the extension of intellectual property
rules to computer software is that software development is a commercial
endeavor. Giving software developers protections against copying is a way
of preventing loss of the revenues they would otherwise derive from the sale
of copies. At the time of CONTU, the assumption may have been generally
valid; although even then, contrary examples existed. Since that time, how-
ever, an entire sector of the software industry has arisen that expressly em-
braces free copying and reuse. This so-called “open-source” or “free
software” movement222 has produced complex, powerful works that rival or
even exceed commercial products in quality and market penetration; indeed,
in enterprise sectors such as supercomputing, web servers, cloud computing,
mobile computing, and embedded systems, use of open-source products
vastly predominates over commercially produced software.223
To be sure, the open-source model has been more successful in some
areas than in others, and there may well be some types of works (including
some types of software) for which it will never supply sufficient encourage-
220. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 26 (2010)
(“The gist of many of the proposals currently making the rounds is to shore up weaknesses in
the positions of established distributors and to strengthen their claims against makers and other
intermediaries as well as readers, listeners, and viewers.”).
221. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Pro-
tection for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2647 (2007) (noting that “[m]any
ground-breaking areas of computer software research have been supported generously”
through “non-market sources of revenue” such as “[g]overnment and private subsidies of re-
search,” all of which bear on the “the need for intellectual property protection” for such
works).
222. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Open source
licensing has become a widely used method of creative collaboration that serves to advance the
arts and sciences in a manner and at a pace that few could have imagined just a few decades
ago.”); Wallace v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1105–06 (7th Cir. 2006)
(describing licensing arrangements allowing free copying, modification, and distribution of
Linux operating system and other open-source projects).
223. See, e.g., Glyn Moody, 2015: Open Source Has Won, But it Isn’t Finished, COM-
PUTERWORLD UK (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.computerworlduk.com/blogs/open-enterprise/
open-source-has-won-3592314, [http://perma.cc/6BRB-M8HN].
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ment for creative development. The rise of the open-source alternative, how-
ever, disproves any assumption that strong intellectual property protections
are the sine qua non of software development. To develop a more robust
understanding (grounded in empirical data) of when intellectual property
rules are necessary in the context of software, and when they are not, should
rank high on the list of objectives for any new CONTU commission.224
Second, the CONTU report presumes that software is mass-distributed,
in the form of copies, to purchasers who wish to use the software. This was,
after all, CONTU’s stated basis for rejecting the alternative of trade secrecy
protection.225 The assumption may have been tolerably accurate as a descrip-
tion of the software industry for many years. More recently, however, the
rise of cloud computing and the “software as a service” model has made
powerful software available to users who never receive a copy of the pro-
gram, but merely interact with it online.226 Law firms, to take only one ex-
ample, increasingly rely on cloud computing applications for functionality as
diverse as “practice management, document management, payroll, human
resources, tax systems, accounting, timekeeping, e-mail spam filtering, liti-
gation support, data hosting, and office productivity,”227 all of which may be
accessed over the web rather than being installed on the law firm’s own
computers. This change in how software is actually made and used may
carry important implications for the proper scope of intellectual property
protection.
2. Public and Private Ordering
Relatedly, Congress should clarify the place of private ordering, through
contracts and licensing, in the development and use of software. Private
agreements on the enforcement of existing copyright rights have received
224. The need for more analytically rigorous assessment of copyright’s actual effects on
expressive output is not, of course, limited to the context of software. See HAGGART, supra
note 212, at 52–53 (“the very question of copyright’s empirical, as opposed to theoretical,
effect on the production of creative works has gone largely unexamined. . . [T]he copyright
debate has been driven much more by rhetoric than evidence.”).
225. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for
the Next Generation of Software, 65 COMM. & STRATEGIES 17, 20 (2007) (“Software licensing
and control over APIs—the lever of power in the previous era—is irrelevant because the
software never need be distributed but only performed . . . .”); Horacio E. Gutie´rrez, Peering
through the Cloud: The Future of Intellectual Property and Computing, 20 FED. CIR. BAR J.
589, 604 (2011) (“Many cloud services will involve minimal distribution of software code to
end users. . . . Thus, providers are likely to rely more heavily on access controls and technolog-
ical protections to supplement or replace traditional copyright protection in the cloud.”); Sam-
uelson, supra note 99, at 1747–48.
227. Diane Murley, Law Libraries in the Cloud, 101 LAW LIBR. J. 245, 251 (2009) (foot-
note omitted).
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general approbation from Congress,228 but private agreements that supersede
or extend those rights remain more controversial. The copyright statute
strikes a particular balance between the rights of creators of expressive
works and the rights of those who use the works.229 Private agreements,
however, may upset this balance: for example, a creator may condition a
user’s access to an expressive work upon the user’s giving up some of the
rights they would otherwise enjoy under the statute.230 For this reason, many
scholars have expressed concern that judicial deference to contract terms
drafted solely with licensors’ interests in mind may effectively upset Con-
gress’s statutory accommodation of competing interests, to the public’s
detriment.231
In a world in which most computer software is merely licensed rather
than sold, the terms contained in licensing agreements may operate to con-
strain end-user behavior much more directly than the terms of the governing
statute. Given the importance of licensing arrangements in this sector, a new
CONTU commission should examine whether software licensors should be
able to override longstanding legal doctrines such as first sale or fair use, or
228. See Role of Voluntary Agreements in the U.S. Intellectual Property System: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 113 Cong., 1st Sess, Serial No. 113-49 (2014). Most of the witnesses who
testified at this hearing expressed general support for the use of voluntary agreements to facili-
tate copyright enforcement—citing, for example, commitments among internet service provid-
ers to “three strikes” policies that impose escalating restrictions on users repeatedly accused of
infringing activity.
229. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (rec-
ognizing the copyright statute’s “balance of competing claims upon the public interest”); Lenz
v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing copyright’s fair
use doctrine as a statutory authorization for user conduct with which copyright holders may
not interfere — in essence, a user-held right); Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Reclaiming
Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright, 11 J. HIGH TECH L. 1 (2011) (“The fact that
fair use is a defense does not make it any less of a right.”). A classic formulation of the
“balance of rights” approach is, of course, L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS (1991) (enumerating distinctive rights held
by authors, publishers, and users in the copyright ecosystem).
230. See, e.g., JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 102–17 (2011) (noting, with many examples, that licensing agreements and
other contracts are frequently drafted to enlarge the scope of publishers’ rights beyond what
copyright law provides and to place additional limits on how licensed works may be used).
231. See, e.g., David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87
CAL. L. REV. 17, 63–68 (1999) (suggesting several scenarios under which copyright’s preemp-
tion doctrine should render particular licensing terms unenforceable); Niva Elken-Koren, Cop-
yright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 93, 108–13
(1997) (highlighting risks to competition and to the creation and reuse of information); Mau-
reen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Pre-
emption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L. J. 479, 541–55 (1995) (articulating a
framework under which courts would assess whether particular copyright licensing arrange-
ments run afoul of other settled public policies). For an argument that the controversy has been
overstated, however, see Guy A. Rub, Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-Contracts
Conflict, 103 VA. L. REV. 1143 (2017).
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whether and under what circumstances the terms of the statute should super-
sede incompatible contractual terms.
B. Are Alternative Forms Superior to Copyright?
The CONTU report settled on copyright protection for software essen-
tially by default. Post-CONTU history, however, shows that the rejected al-
ternatives may deserve a closer look.
1. The Patent Alternative
CONTU rejected patenting software on largely theoretical grounds.
Based on subsequent developments, however, we now have several decades
of experience with software patenting, and a richer appreciation of the pros
and cons of extending patent protection to software.232 Furthermore, the de-
bate now has a global dimension, with some countries embracing patent pro-
tections for software and others resisting it.233 The supporting arguments on
both sides deserve a fair hearing and a thoughtful response. Perhaps even if
patent protection is appropriate for some types of software, it is not appropri-
ate for all types. Perhaps patent protection is inappropriate in any instance,
and the core concerns of developers who wish to guard against wrongful
takings of their code may be addressed adequately via copyright, contract,
trade secrecy, or misappropriation principles, or through technological
means.234 Or perhaps patent protection is highly motivating to software de-
velopment and should be retained or even expanded (in which case, legisla-
tive action to limit the reach of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice may
be appropriate).235 The point is simply that the issue is, at a minimum, ripe
232. See, e.g., Mark H. Webbink, A New Paradigm for Intellectual Property Rights in
Software, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12 (2005) (noting conflicting evidence on whether
patent protection has positive effects on software innovation); Chad King, Note, Abort, Retry,
Fail: Protection for Software-Related Inventions in the Wake of State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1159–69 (2000) (arguing that
patent protection is superior to the available alternatives due to its focus on protecting
software’s functional attributes, which other forms of intellectual property protection exclude).
233. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52(2)(c) (excluding “pro-
grams for computers” from scope of under European patent law); see also, supra note 143.
234. See Innovation in America (Part I and II): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 113-47, at 83 (2014) (“Evidence as to whether providing software
with patent protection in addition to copyright protection has promoted innovation is not en-
couraging.”) (prepared statement of Computer & Communications Industry Association). For a
cogent argument that strong patent protections for software cause producers to shift invest-
ments away from inventive activity to defensive measures that yield no social benefit, see
Jason M. Schultz & Brian J. Love, Brief of Amici Curiae Law, Business, and Economics Schol-
ars in Support of Respondents in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al., 4
N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT’MT L. 358 (2015).
235. This is the suggestion of David McKinney, Comment, Alice: Tumbling Down the
Rabbit Hole of Software Patent Eligibility, 84 UMKC L. REV. 261, 280–81 (2015). If one
concludes that the functional character of software entitles it to protection under patent law, a
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for reexamination based on all that has happened in the years since the origi-
nal CONTU.236
2. The Trade Secrecy Alternative
As already noted, the stated factual basis for CONTU’s rejection of
trade secrecy protection for software—to wit, that software is distributed to
the public in a way that makes “secrecy” untenable—is an increasingly inac-
curate description of reality.237 In the meantime, CONTU’s concerns about
state-by-state variation in trade secret law have been at least partly amelio-
rated through the enactment of the first federal trade secrecy statute238 and
by the adoption by the great majority of states of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act.239 These developments counsel revisiting CONTU’s conclusion that
trade secrecy protection is inadequate for software.240
3. Sui Generis Protection
Renowned copyright scholar Benjamin Kaplan recognized over half a
century ago that software may not fit any of our existing analytical para-
digms for intellectual property; it may be too functional for copyright but too
expressive for patenting.241 The original CONTU report selected copyright
as the closest fit of the many imperfect alternatives it considered. At the time
the original CONTU made its recommendations, copyright was essentially a
logical consequence should be a corresponding withdrawal of copyright protection. See, e.g.,
Lemley, supra note 62, at 26 (“As software patents gain increasingly broad protection,
whatever reasons there once were for broad copyright protection of computer programs disap-
pear.”); Pamela Samuelson, Are Copyright and Patent Overlapping or Mutually Exclusive in
Protecting Software Innovations?, PATENTLY-O (May 27, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/
2017/05/overlapping-protecting-innovations.html (discussing 1991 study jointly prepared by
USPTO and the U.S. Copyright Office that concluded that overlapping copyright and patent
protection could not exist for software), archived at [perma.cc/S8C3-R8F4].
236. For an interesting suggestion that patent-like analysis should be imported into copy-
right law for software cases, yielding a hybrid form of protection, see Kristina Soderquist, Yet
Another Suggestion for Solving the Computer Program Dilemma, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 14,
¶¶ 31–53 (2001).
237. See supra notes 45–46, 226–227 and accompanying text.
238. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. See also
Tony Dutra, New Trade Secret Law: More to Consider in Patent Trade-Off, 92 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 2264, at 340 (June 3, 2016).
239. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’r on
Unif. State Laws 1985).
240. For an argument that trade secrecy protection may be a superior alternative to
software patenting, see Michael Risch, Hidden in Plain Sight, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1635
(2016); but cf. Derek E. Bambauer, Secrecy is Dead—Long Live Trade Secrets, 93 DENVER U.
L. REV. 833, 846–49 (2016) (noting that expansion of trade secrecy protection potentially
creates new conflicts with other significant social values).
241. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Other calls for sui generis protection for
software antedated the 1976 Act. See, e.g., supra note 21 and accompanying text. And many
scholars have taken up the call in the intervening decades. See, e.g., Samuelson, et al., supra
note 4, at 2312–13 n.6.
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unitary body of law that applied the same rules to all expressive works. In
later years, however, Congress has come to recognize that some industries
are different and need different forms of protection tailored to their particu-
lar characteristics. For example, the copyright statute now includes chapters
defining sui generis forms of legal protection for semiconductors242 and the
design of boat hulls and decks.243 It would not be inconsistent with these
more recent enactments to conclude that software, too, demands a nuanced
form of legal protection attuned to its particular characteristics.244 The possi-
ble benefits of providing sui generis protection to software works would
have to be balanced, of course, against the possible costs in the form of
fragmentation of doctrine and the introduction of concepts into the law that
have no clear contextual meaning.245
C. What Limits to Copyright Protection?
A new CONTU commission could provide valuable guidance to the
courts even if it adheres to the original CONTU Report’s conclusion that
copyright is the form of protection best suited to computer software.
1. Functional versus Expressive Variation
The courts in Whelan and Oracle both justified the extension of broad
copyright protection to software on the grounds that programmers could
have expressed their ideas in the software in multiple ways.246 But this rea-
soning merely sidesteps the question, confronted forthrightly in Altai and
Lotus, whether functional variation stands on the same legal footing as ex-
pressive variation in copyright.247 Outside the software context, the courts in
copyright cases have recognized a distinction between a variation in a
work’s utilitarian or functional attributes (which cannot receive copyright
242. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–914 (2012)).
243. See Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1332 (2012).
244. To consider only one of those characteristics: although works of art and literature
may enjoy commercial success spanning multiple decades, most commercial software has a far
shorter viable shelf life. Consider two copyrighted works released in the year 1985: the film
Back to the Future and the Microsoft Windows 1.0 operating system. The former work contin-
ues to enjoy consumer demand three decades later and the latter does not. The fact that the
copyright system treats both works as works made for hire and extends them each the same
duration of legal protection (nearly a century) under 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) illustrates the occa-
sionally strange consequences of treating software the same as all other expressive works.
245. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Para-
digms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2502–03 (1994) (criticizing various forms of sui generis
intellectual property protection as ignoring the copyright and patent acts’ efforts to “balance
the public interest in competition against specific incentives to create”; sui generis protections
are “improvised responses to sectoral protectionist demands” that “lack coherent theoretical
foundations and reflect different economic premises”); Leo J. Raskind, The Uncertain Case for
Special Legislation Protecting Computer Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1131 (1985).
246. See supra notes 67–69, 110–113.
247. See supra notes 86–87, 98 and accompanying text.
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protection) and variation in a work’s expressive attributes (which can).248 In
the context of software, however, the courts’ views on this question remain
muddled, at least in part because the original CONTU Report’s views on the
same question were similarly uncertain.249 A new CONTU may shed new
light on the question and achieve a level of consensus that has so far eluded
the courts.
2. Imitation, Incentives, and Copyright
A new CONTU should also explore the role, widely recognized in the
intervening decades, that successful imitation of prior functionality plays in
both the training of software developers and the making of software itself.
To a degree perhaps underappreciated in the case law, radical innovation in
software development can be dysfunctional, introducing problems that are
avoided by making cautious, incremental changes to earlier working code.250
To the extent that training and development in software engineering rests in
part upon borrowing and imitation of earlier works, introducing excessively
strong copyright principles into the picture may exert an inhibiting force. For
that reason, it would be highly desirable for a new CONTU commission to
enunciate principles relating to authorship, originality, and fair use of
software works should it conclude that continued protection under copyright
is the best available alternative.
248. Compare ATC Distribution Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions &
Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 706–10 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding a catalog listing of part numbers to
show only functional variation rather than expressive variation); with American Dental Ass’n
v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding expressive variation in
a taxonomy and written description of dental procedures).
249. See, e.g., supra notes 48, 54 and accompanying text; see also Menell, supra note
119, manuscript at 46–47 (arguing that Federal Circuit’s opinion in Oracle v. Google conflates
expressive and technological variation).
250. This is a key insight of observers of the open-source software phenomenon. As one
author put it:
A good programmer is “lazy like a fox.” Because it is so hard and time consuming
to write good code, the lazy fox is always searching for efficiencies. . .. The last
thing a programmer, particularly a volunteer programmer, wants to do is build from
scratch a solution to a problem that someone else has already solved or come close
to solving.
STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 75 (2004); see also ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE
CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR 4 (1999) (“[a]n important trait of the great [programmers] is
constructive laziness. . .. it’s almost always easier to start from a good partial solution than
from nothing at all”).
